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MARK T. IMPERIAL* & DEREK KAUNECKIS*"

Moving from Conflict to
Collaboration: Watershed Governance
in Lake Tahoe
ABSTRACT
This article examines the evolution of watershed governance in
the Lake Tahoe Basin. The early years of watershed management
were characterized by a high degree of conflict. However, the last
decade has seen dramatic changes. Organizations once embroiled
in intense conflict with one another now work together on
common goals to improve environmental conditions. The
evolution of the governance system in Lake Tahoe is examined by
looking at changes in intergovernmental relations and interactions between public agencies and civil society actors. Lessons
are then drawn to provide advicefor practitionersseeking to use
collaborationas an implementation strategy.
INTRODUCTION
Lake Tahoe has long been known as a unique natural resource
renowned for its exceptional water clarity, picturesque location, and
diverse range of recreational opportunities. The basin's location, 150
miles from San Francisco and 90 miles from Sacramento, puts it within a
short drive of more than eight million people.' The transient visitor
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Administration Program in the Department of Political Science at the University of North
Carolina at Wilmington. He can be reached at imperialm@uncw.edu.
** Derek Kauneckis is a Ph.D. Candidate in the Joint Program in Public Policy and an
Associate Instructor in the Department of Political Science and the School of Public and
Environmental Affairs at Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana. He can be reached at
dkauneck@indiana.edu.
This article was funded in part by research conducted for the National Academy of
Public Administration as part of their Learning from Innovations in Environmental Protection Project. Both authors are grateful to Leslie Koziol and Katheryn Summers for their
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manuscript.
1
Carol J. Boughton et al., Dep't of the Interior, Stream and Ground Water Monitoring
Program, Lake Tahoe Basin, Nevada and California, FACT SHEET FS-100-97, U.S. GEOLOGICAL
SURVEY, June 1997, at 1.
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population exceeds 200,000 on peak holidays and exceeds 23 million on
annual visitor days.2 In the 1990s, tourism was a $1 billion dollar
industry employing more than 20,000 people.3 The lake's depth (1636
feet), altitude, and low average yearly temperatures create a unique
ecological system. Given its economic and ecological importance, it is not
surprising that the efforts to protect Lake Tahoe date back more than
four decades.
Historically, much of the inter-organizational conflict in the
basin surrounded the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) and its
regulatory programs. The TRPA is a regional environmental and
planning agency created to manage water quality in the basin. While the
first two decades of its existence were contentious, the last decade has
witnessed dramatic changes. There has been a shift from conflictoriented interactions among agencies and civil society groups in the
basin toward increasingly cooperative approaches to addressing basin
problems. While early efforts focused primarily on developing the TRPA
as a centralized regulatory agency, through which all development and
permitting occurred, current efforts emphasize nonregulatory
approaches such as habitat restoration, best management practices
(BMPs), and environmental improvements through redevelopment. In
recent years, the TRPA has moved toward decentralizing decision
making to local governments in order to streamline its permitting
program. It has also entered into cooperative arrangements with many of
the same governmental and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
that it had been in conflict with previously.
Lake Tahoe's well-documented history of water management
efforts provides an interesting case for examining the evolution of
watershed governance. This examination uncovers the increasing
importance of decentralized, collaborative approaches to natural
resource management. The information for the study was collected from
two primary sources. Field interviews were conducted with 41
individuals representing 27 different organizations active in the Lake
Tahoe watershed governance system. The individuals were identified
using a snowball sampling technique.4 Documents and archival records
2. Deborah L. Elliot-Fisk et al., Lake Tahoe Case Study, in SIERRA NEVADA ECOSYSTEM
PROJECT: FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, ADDENDUM 217, 238 (Centers for Water & Wildland
Res., Wildland Res. Center Report No. 40, Mar. 1997).
3. Id.
4. Interviewing a wide range of individuals representing a wide range of
organizations is important. A recent study of watershed partnerships found that
information obtained from watershed coordinators is often systematically biased towards
success. It also found that the differences between participants and nonparticipants are not
nearly as great as the differences between the coordinators and everyone else. See William
D. Leach, Surveying Diverse Stakeholder Groups, 15 Soc'Y & NAT. RESOURCES 1, 641 (2002).
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about basin programs, planning, and governance efforts were also
examined. Systematic qualitative techniques such as coding were used to
examine these data sets. Quotes and short vignettes were identified to
provide context. A detailed timeline was also prepared to evaluate key
events and historical patterns.5 Examining different data sources allowed
a strategy of triangulation to increase the validity of the findings.6 A draft
case study was sent to principal informants for factual verification.7
This article addresses a number of important questions about the
evolution of governance systems and intergovernmental networks that
are a by-product of our federal system of government. We begin by
discussing the concepts of governance and collaboration. Next, we
describe the environmental problems affecting Lake Tahoe. The article
then describes the evolution of watershed governance as basin
institutions have tried to address these environmental problems over the
past four decades. Emphasis is given to the critical events and the factors
facilitating the transition from a period of interorganizational conflict to
increasingly cooperative approaches to basin governance. Finally, we
conclude with advice to practitioners seeking to use collaboration as a
strategy for improving watershed governance.
GOVERNANCE AND COLLABORATION IN WATERSHED
MANAGEMENT
Governance refers to the means for achieving direction, control,
and coordination of individuals and organizations with varying degrees
of autonomy in order to advance joint objectives. It involves more than
the configuration of governmental and nongovernmental organizations.
Governance includes enabling statutes, organizational and financial
resources, programmatic structures, and administrative rules and
routines. It also includes the formal and informal rules, social norms, and
structures governing relationships between organizations. This structure
is inherently political and involves bargaining, negotiation, and compromise. It is also a dynamic process that evolves over time. As one agency

5. See Derek Kauneckis et al., Tahoe Regional Planning Agency: The Evolution of
Collaboration3, 4 (Nat'l Academy of Public Admin., July 2000), available at http://www.
napawash.org/pc-economy-environment/trpa.pdf (last visited Nov. 6,2003).
6. Triangulation is using independent measures derived from different sources to
support, or at least not contradict, a research finding. See ROBERT K. YIN, CASE STUDY
RESEARCH: DESIGN AND METHODS 91-93 (2d ed. 1994).
7. See Kauneckis et al., supra note 5, at 3 (providing additional discussion of the
methods used for our study).
8. For a discussion of the concept of governance, see generally Laurence E. Lynn et
al., Studying Governance and Public Management: Challenges and Prospects, 10 J. PUB. ADMIN.
RES. & THEORY 233 (2000); H. GEORGE FREDERICKSON, THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC ADMINI-
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official in Lake Tahoe put it, current efforts are just "a single thread in
the fabric" of an evolving governance system.
Watersheds provide an excellent opportunity for examining the
evolution of governance systems, because they span political, ecological,
and geographic boundaries. Policies and programs affecting watersheds
are categorized by environmental medium (e.g., air, water, soil, land use,
etc.), tailored to specific types of land use (e.g., wetlands, coastal zone,
tidal waters, agricultural land, forest land, etc.), and divided among
various agencies, each responsible for a different administrative function
(e.g., permitting, enforcement, public education, etc.). The corresponding
fragmentation ensures that no organization or single level of government
has the power or authority to compel others to act. 9 Thus, it is not
uncommon to find that
no organization of government possesses sufficient authority, resources, and knowledge to effect the enactment and
achievement of policy intentions. Instead, policies require
the concerted efforts of multiple actors, all possessing
significant capabilities but each dependent on multiple
others to solidify policy intention and convert it into action.
Indeed, it is often difficult for any one actor, or group of
actors, to manage, or manipulate, the flow of problems and
solutions onto the political agenda in the first place.10
Collaboration is defined as any joint activity by two or more
organizations intended to increase public value by working together
rather than separately." It involves autonomous actors who use shared
rules, norms, or organizational structures to act or make decisions
related to a specific issue or problem.12 This definition includes a wide
range of collaborative arrangements. It can be understood as voluntary
relationships between two or more organizations in a network of horizontal actors. Accordingly, it is fundamentally different from a
STRATION (1996); H. Brinton Milward & Keith G. Provan, Governing the Hollow State, 10 J.
PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 359 (2000).

9. Mark T. Imperial & Timothy M. Hennessey, Environmental Governance in
Watersheds: The Importance of Collaborationto InstitutionalPerformance, in ENVIRONMENT.Gov:
TRANSFORMING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION FOR THE 21st CENTURY 8.7, 8.58 (Nat'l Acad.
of Public Admin., Res. Papers 1-7, 2000).
10. Hans Bressers et al., Networks as Models of Analysis: Water Policy in Comparative
Perspective, in NETWORKS FOR WATER POLICY: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1,4 (Hans
Bressers et al. eds., 1995).
EUGENE BARDACH, GETTING AGENCIES TO WORK TOGETHER: THE PRACTICE AND
11.
THEORY OF MANAGERIAL CRAFTSMANSHIP 8 (1998). See generally MARK H. MOORE,
CREATING PUBLIC VALUE: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT IN GOVERNMENT (1995).

12.

Barbara Gray & Donna J. Wood, Collaborative Alliances: Moving from Practice to

Theory, 27 J.APPLIED BEHAV. SC. 3, 4 (1991).
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hierarchical or vertical arrangement where formal control mechanisms
exist between actors at different levels. Since collaborative relationships
are often informal and temporary, they tend to be characterized by
bargaining, negotiation, and compromise rather than formal de jure
control. Thus, in a collaborative arrangement, participants remain
autonomous and must be convinced to cooperate rather than being
forced to do so. 13
Our use of the term governance is deliberate. Watershed
governance is an evolutionary process through which rules and
institutions are built." Emphasizing the concept of governance also
draws attention to the real challenge for practitioners, namely finding
ways to improve watershed management in a world of shared power
where the capacity for solving policy problems is widely dispersed and
few organizations have the power to accomplish even their own mission
by acting alone, let alone solve complex environmental problems." In
some instances, improving watershed governance requires completely
new institutions, programs, and policies. The TRPA was created to fill
this need in Lake Tahoe where it serves as "the" planning department
for all of the basin's governmental and nongovernmental actors [Table
1.
However, improving watershed governance often requires a
great deal more than simply creating a new institution because every
watershed is "managed" by decisions of governmental and
nongovernmental organizations that influence the health and integrity of
ecological systems. Accordingly, enhancing existing watershed
governance is often more complicated than creating a new agency or
program. It requires collaboration resulting in the combination of
existing institutions, programs, and policies in new ways in order to
improve cooperation and generate public value. Lake Tahoe illustrates
both approaches to enhancing watershed governance, creating new
institutions and collaboration.

13. See Nelson Phillips et al., Interorganizational Collaboration and the Dynamic of
Institutional Fields, 37 J. MGMT. STUD. 23 (2000); Thomas B. Lawrence et al., Institutional
Effects of InterorganizationalCollaboration: The Emergence of Proto-institutions,45 ACAD. OF
MGMT. J. 281 (2002).
14. See gemerally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE AcTION (1990).

15. Indeed, this is the central challenge for public administrators in general. See
generally Milward & Provan, supranote 8.
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Table 1: Description of the Main Actors in Lake Tahoe's Governance System
Brief Description
Organizations
Created in 1969 pursuant to a federal-state compact; a bi-state
Tahoe Regional
regional planning and regulatory agency with a staff of over
Planning Agency
50 people. Maintains environmental standards, issues permits,
(TRPA)
has enforcement powers, and is charged with attaining state
and federal water and air quality standards. Directed by a 15
member governing board of various federal, state, and local
officials and a 19 member Advisory Planning Commission
(APC) comprised of highly educated professionals.
Manages 77 percent of the land in the watershed. Unlike many
U.S. Dep't of
USFS plans that emphasize resource extraction, the LTBMU
Agriculture (USDA)
plan emphasizes water quality protection. Spends $500,000
Forest Service (USFS)
per year to correct erosion problems. Is also involved in the
Lake Tahoe Basin
acquisition of ecologically sensitive private parcels through
Management Unit
the Santini-Burton Act (P.L. 96-586), which has provided $100
(LTBMU)
million for land acquisition.
The California State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB),
State Water Quality
Board
Control
Quality
Water
Regional
Lahontan
Agencies
(LRWQCB)/Nevada Department of Environmental Protection
(NDEP). Implement state water quality laws and the CWA.
The LRWQCB has been more involved than the NDEP and
still implements the watershed's Section 208 plan pursuant to
the CWA.
Independent state agency created in 1984. A board of state and
California Tahoe
local officials makes decisions. To date, the CTC funded more
Conservancy (CTC)
than $175 million on land acquisition and restoration projects.
Acquired more than 5450 undeveloped and environmentally
sensitive private parcels covering more than 6000 acres.
There are six local governments: Placer County (CA), Douglas
Local Governments
County (CA), City of South Lake Tahoe (CA), Washoe County
(NV), El Dorado County (NV), and Carson City (NV).
Formed in the early 1980s in response to the TRPA's reThe Gaming Alliance
organization, it represents the gaming industry's interests and
was instrumental in helping form the Tahoe Transportation
and Water Quality Coalition.
The League to Save
Lake Tahoe
Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council
Tahoe Transportation
and Water Quality
Coalition

Tahoe Research
Group (TRG)

Created in 1957 and is the oldest environmental organization
dedicated to protecting Lake Tahoe. Serves as a "watchdog"
and scrutinizes every project brought before TRPA.
Formed in 1981 to represent the rights of private property
owners; has filed numerous lawsuits against TRPA.
Established in 1989 and is a coalition of basin actors including
The League to Save Lake Tahoe, Tahoe Gaming Alliance, The
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, and other NGOs focused
on finding creative solutions to transportation and water
quality problems. Also prepares the Lake Tahoe Joint Federal
Legislation Agenda.
Coordinates the Lake Tahoe Interagency Monitoring Program
(LTIMP), established in 1979 to collect and analyze water and
air quality data.
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LAKE TAHOE'S ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS
Lake Tahoe straddles the California/Nevada border with
approximately two-thirds of the watershed area located in California and
one-third in Nevada [Figure 116]. The watershed comprises 506 square
miles of which the lake's surface covers 192 square miles (38 percent).
The lake is 22 miles long and 12 miles wide, which makes it the largest
alpine lake in North America. The bottom of the lake plunges to a depth
of 1646 feet, the third deepest in the United States. 17 Water clarity is
currently around 70 feet and is matched only by Russia's Lake Baikal
and Oregon's Crater and Waldo Lakes." Alpine peaks surround the lake
in every direction and provide a visually distinct watershed boundary.
The surrounding peaks range from around 6500 to 10,000 feet in
elevation with slopes often greater than 20 percent. This serves to limit
development to the relatively flat area along the shoreline."
Lake Tahoe is renowned for its clarity and crystalline blue
waters. The exceptional clarity of Lake Tahoe is due to low algal growth.
Like all plants, algae need sunlight and nutrients to live. Under natural
conditions, the lake receives only a small amount of nutrients due to
natural filtering mechanisms such as wetlands and vegetation, which
slow down sediment transport and absorb nutrients. Left undisturbed,
algal growth would occur so slowly that the changes would be
imperceptible over a lifetime.
However, the steep slopes and erodible soils make the watershed extremely sensitive to human disturbance. Factors contributing to
increased sedimentation and nutrient loadings include artificially high
lake levels, erosion from land development activities, stormwater runoff,
wetland loss, atmospheric deposition of nutrients, and logging activities
[Table 2].Y Exacerbating these effects is the lake's 700-year flushing time,

16. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA), Regional Plan for the Lake Tahoe Basin:
Goals and Policies (Apr. 1999).
17. CAROL A. MYERS & ANGELIA M. THACKER, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, STREAM AND
GROUND-WATER MONITORING PROGRAM: LAKE TAHOE BASIN, NEVADA AND CALIFORNIA 1

(June 1997).
18. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA), Regional Plan for the Lake Tahoe Basin:
2001 Threshold Evaluation Draft 3-29-3-35 (TRPA 2001), available at http://www.trpa.org/
News/2001_Thresholds.htnd [hereinafter 2001 Threshold Evaluation] (last visited Nov. 20,
2003).
19. Boughton et al., supra note 1, at 1.
20.

See CAL. REG'L WATER QUALITY CONTROL BD.-LAHONTAN REGION (SWQCB),

WATER QUALITY CONTROL PLAN FOR THE LAHONTAN REGION 5-2 (Cal. Reg'l Water Quality
Control Bd. 1995) [hereinafter SWQCB], available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/rwqcb6/
BPlan/BPlanlndex.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2004). See also SIERRA NEVADA ECOSYSTEM
PROJECT, supra note 2, at 228, 275.
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which makes it act like a huge sink. Thus, continued nutrient loading
2
increases phytoplankton productivity, which decreases water clarity. '
Figure 1: The Lake Tahoe Watershed, California and Nevada

ts Tabo R

(A d.1bwdby b, Talo.
RoqiosaPMbft COMoPWsi

NAT'L EUTROPHICATION SURV.
21.
LAB., REPORT ON LAKE TAHOE CARSON
DORADO AND PLACER COUNTIES, CAL.
Surv., Working Paper No. 810, 1977).
supranote 20, at 5-2.

& SPECIAL STUD. BRANCH, CORVALLIS ENVTL. RES.
CITY, DOUGLAS AND WASHOE COUNTIES, NEVADA EL
EPA REGION IX, at 1-9 (EPA & Nat'l Eutrophication
See also CAL. REG'L WATER QUALITY CONTROL BD.,
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Table 2: Sources of Lake Tahoe's Water Quality Problems
Cause
Effect
Roads (construction
Land disturbance increases susceptibility to erosion
and maintenance)
*
Sand applied to roads during the winter contributes to
sedimentation, including the addition of small colloidal
particles that suspend in the water column
Flat, smooth surfaces allow runoff to travel at higher
velocities, which results in increased sedimentation and
flooding
Stream Environment
Nutrient and sediment loading due to removal of natural
Zone
(SEZ)
filtering mechanisms
Destruction
and Source of nutrients and sediment when disturbed
Disturbance
*
Increased flooding
Vegetation Removal
*
Nutrient loading from sedimentation and precipitation
Increased velocity of runoff, which exacerbates erosion
problems
Fertilizer Use
*
Nutrient loading to ground and surface water
Leaking
Sewer *
Nutrient loading to ground and surface water
Systems
Industries Located
*
Atmospheric deposition of nutrients in the watershed
West of the Basin
Impervious
*
Increases runoff
Surface/
*
Increases nutrient loading and sedimentation
Urbanization

In 1968, when consistent measurements were first taken,
transparency was measured at around 100 feet. It is currently around 70
feet (depending on the time of year). While there is some indication that
the rate of decline in transparency has slowed, it is difficult to tell given
the lake's slow response time (around 20 years), changing weather
patterns, and the variability in the data. = Halting and reversing declining
lake clarity is now the top environmental priority for basin actors.
The land use pattern in the basin has changed considerably over
time. During the mid-1800s, the Basin was extensively logged to provide
timber for the Nevada silver mines of the Comstock Lode. Extensive
logging then caused a shift in land use to agriculture, ranching, and
development of large private estates and commercial resorts beginning
in the early 1900s. Agriculture and ranching activities were gradually
phased out and many of the large private estates were subdivided when
development pressures increased after World War II.' However, due to
its inaccessibility, Lake Tahoe remained primarily a summer destination
for the wealthy until the 1950s.

22. 2001 Threshold Evaluation, supra note 18.
23. WES INGRAM & PAUL SABATIER, A DEscRIFrivE HISTORY OF LAND USE AND WATER
QUALITY PLANNING INTHE LAKE TAHOE BASIN 10-12 (Inst. of Ecology, Rep. No. 31, 1987).
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In the 1950s, Lake Tahoe's residential population was around
2850 with a yearly visitation of around 30,000.24 By 1995, the summer
population was estimated at 102,000 with approximately 60,000
permanent residents.' Much of the development occurred from the mid1950s until the mid-1980s and was fueled by casino development,
improved highway access, and the development of winter sports
26
facilities triggered by the 1960 Winter Olympics in Squaw Valley. There
are now approximately 42,800 year-round homes and 9600 vacation
homes in the watershed.27 Much of the development is either directly or
indirectly tied to tourism, the life-blood of Lake Tahoe's economy.
LAKE TAHOE'S EVOLVING GOVERNANCE SYSTEM
Given Lake Tahoe's unique ecological characteristics and its
economic importance to the region, it is not surprising that watershed
governance efforts date back more than four decades. The following
sections describe the major events shaping Lake Tahoe's governance
system. It has been divided into four historic periods representing major
shifts in the approach to managing the watershed. A chronology of key
2
events in the history of basin governance is provided in Table 3.

DOUGLAS H. STRONG, TAHOE: AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY 51 (1984).
Elliot-Fisk et al., supra note 2, at 238.
DEP'T OF AGRiC., THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE AND OTHER
FEDERAL AGENCIES IN THE LAKE TAHOE REGION 9 (1979).
27. Mark Nechodom et al., Chapter 6: Social, Economic, and Institutional Assessment, in
24.
25.
26.

LAKE TAHOE WATERSHED ASSESSMENT 67 (1999) (unpublished draft, on file with author).

28. The following discussion of the evolution of Lake Tahoe's governance system
builds on the earlier work of Paul Sabatier. See INGRAM & SABATIER, supra note 23; Paul A.
Sabatier & Anne Brasher, From Vague Consensus to Clearly Differentiated Coalitions:
Environmental Policy at Lake Tahoe, 1964-1985, in POLICY CHANGE AND LEARNING: AN
ADVOCACY COALITION APPROACH 177-208 (Paul Sabatier & J.A. Jenkins-Smith eds., 1993);
PAUL A. SABATIER & NEIL W. PELKEY, LAND DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE AT LAKE TAHOE,
1960-84: THE EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS AND ECONOMIC COALITIONS ON
HOUSING CONSTRUCTION (1990); Paul Sabatier et al., The Devil Shift: Perceptions and
Misperceptions of Opponents, 40 W. POL. Q. 449 (1987). See generally DOUGLAS H. STRONG,
TAHOE: FROM TIMBER BARONS TO ECOLOGISTS (1999); SUSANNE BENTLEY, LAKE STORIES: AN
EXPLORATION OF THE IMPACT OF HUMANS ON THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE LAKE TAHOE BASIN

(1997) (unpublished dissertation, Univ. of Nevada at Reno) (on file with author); Richard
Fink, Public Land Acquisition for Environmental Protection: Structuring a Programfor the Lake
Tahoe Basin, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 485 (1991); LAURENCE B. BAXTER, REGIONAL POLITICS AND THE
CHALLENGE OF ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING (Inst. of Govtl. Affairs, Envtl. Quality Series
No. 22, 1974); ROBERT A. BURCO, POLICY AND PLANNING IN THE LAKE TAHOE BASIN: THE
CASE OF TRANSPORTATION (Inst. of Govtl. Affairs, Envtl. Quality Series No. 22, 1973);
WILLIAM E. FELTS & GEOFFREY WANDESFORDE-SMITH, THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENTAL
REVIEW IN THE LAKE TAHOE BASIN (Inst. of Govtl. Affairs, Envtl. Quality Series No. 16,

1973).
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Table 3: Evolution of Lake Tahoe's Governance System
The Technical Fix (1959-1965)
*
1959 Lake Tahoe Area Council is formed
*
1964 Controversial Lake Tahoe 1980 Regional Plan
*
1965 States begin efforts to export all sewage out of the basin
Development of a Regional Agency (1965-1972)
*
1969 Interstate Compact is adopted
*
1970 TRPA begins operation
*
1971 TRPA approves Regional Plan
*
1972 TRPA approves its first Land Use Ordinance
Disillusionment with the TRPA (1972-1980)
*
1973 Controversial New casino and mall projects approved
*
1975 California and Nevada pass different versions of a revised Compact and
begin negotiations
*
1978 All Sewage is exported from the basin
*
1979 Report by Western Federal Regional Council highlights governance
problems
The Decade of Negotiation (1980-1989)
*
1980 TRPA Compact revised
*
1981 TRPA imposes a moratorium on new housing around the lake
*
1982 TRPA adopts nine Environmental Threshold Carrying Capacities
(ETCCs)
*
1984 Court injunction blocks approval of the 1984 Regional Plan
*
1984 Nevada threatens to pullout of the compact
*
1985 California Tahoe Conservancy established
*
1985 Consensus Workshop Group (CWG) implemented by TRPA to revise the
Regional Plan
*
1987 Regional Plan approved that contains the IPES and TDRs
The Era of Collaboration (1989-present)
*
1989 The Tahoe Transportation Coalition formed
1991 First Five-year threshold review is released
*
1996 Second Five-year threshold review is released
*
1997 Presidential Summit
*
1998 EIP Approved
*
2001 EIP Revised
*
2001 Third Five-year threshold review is released

The Technical Fix (1959-1966)
The explosion of residential and commercial development in the
1950s triggered the earliest efforts to improve watershed governance.9
Between 1956 and 1962, the basin's permanent population increased
from 2850 to 16,000. Two large development projects in particular
sparked concern. The first, Tahoe Keys, was a large subdivision that
destroyed a significant portion of the 1100-acre Pope Marsh on the
Upper Truckee River, the basin's largest wetland area. The second,

29. For discussion of planning efforts prior to 1960, see W. TURRENTINE JACKSON,
EARLY PLANNING EFFORTS AT LAKE TAHOE: THE ROLE OF JOSEPH F. MCDONALD 1956-1963
(Inst. of Govtl. Affairs, Envtl. Quality Series No. 18, 1972).
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Incline Valley, involved multi-unit condominiums constructed on the
steep slopes on the northeastern side of the lake.
Projects such as these provided the impetus in 1959 to create the
Lake Tahoe Area Council (LTAC), a nonprofit organization representing
an array of basin interests. Its goal was to encourage research on Lake
Tahoe and to act as a facilitator to resolve contentious development
issues. Initially, LTAC was greeted with broad support. However,
support soon dwindled when some individuals and organizations
became more concerned with promoting economic growth than
protecting water quality.3'
One of LTAC's major accomplishments was the establishment of
a regional planning commission in each local jurisdiction. Collectively,
the commissions formed an umbrella advisory organization, the Tahoe
Regional Planning Commission (TRPC). In 1964, the TRPC funded the
creation of the Lake Tahoe 1980 Regional Plan, intended to provide a
central development plan for the entire basin. It included a divided fourlane highway encircling the lake, with a bridge over Emerald Bay (now
an International Natural Heritage Site), and projected a buildout
population of over 313,000 by 1980. While no entity was identified to
implement the plan, the future it envisioned frightened many residents
and spurred individuals and agencies to take action to save Lake Tahoe
from the scenario depicted in the "1980 Plan." It also strengthened
support for a nonprofit organization, the League to Save Lake Tahoe,
created in 1957 to monitor development and advocate greater
environmental protection.
Around the same time, LTAC funded a study directly
addressing basin water quality entitled Comprehensive Study on Protection
of Water Resources of the Lake Tahoe Basin Through Controlled Waste Disposal
(1963). Referred to as the "McCaughey Report," this study focused on
pollution problems associated with the lack of adequate sewage
treatment and erosion from land development activities. The report
recommended the removal of all sewage from the basin in order to
reduce nutrient flows into the lake.32 Although direct sewage discharges
to the lake had been prohibited since 1915 in California and 1949 in
Nevada, treated effluent was either disposed of on nearby land or
trucked out of the basin. Sewage was also stored in septic tanks and
poorly treated sewage occasionally discharged into rivers. On Labor Day
1961, two million gallons of effluent drained into Lake Tahoe from an
overflow at the sewage treatment plant.33
30.
31.
32.
33.

SABATIER & PELKEY, supra note 28, at 31.
Id. at 26; Ingram & SABATIER, supra note 23, at 10-12.

STRONG, supra note 28, at 66.
DEP'T OF AGRIc., supra note 26, at 12.
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The release of the McCaughey Report, timed with the sewage
overflow, triggered a number of reactions by public officials. The
President's Water Quality Advisory Board and the Governors of
California and Nevada held public meetings to focus attention on
declining water quality.- By late 1966, California and Nevada passed
resolutions calling for all sewage to be exported out of the basin.
Prohibitions were subsequently added to state water quality plans in
1972.-l The construction of the sewage treatment facilities necessary to
export the sewage from the basin began in the 1960s and was completed
in 1978 .
While the installation of sewer systems addressed an important
water quality problem, it had some unforeseen and deleterious effects. It
removed what had been an important development constraint. Land that
had been unsuitable for septic systems, and therefore not suitable for
residential development, was now available. Moreover, at the time
there were virtually no growth restrictions and little residential planning
imposed by local governments. During the 1960s, almost 20,000 housing
units were approved, most of which were for hotels and motels.3 Large
tracts of land were also subdivided, nearly doubling the parcels available
for home construction. 39
Development of a Regional Planning Agency (1965-1972)
To respond to these problems, in 1965 the California and Nevada
legislatures created the Lake Tahoe Joint Study Committee (LTJSC), a
nine-member board comprised of representatives from the local board of
commissioners/supervisors in each state, a member from a state agency,
and one at-large member. The committee held public hearings and
ratified its final report in 1967.' o It recommended creating a regional
planning agency headed by a governing board with a governor's
STRONG, supra note 28, at 65.
35. Elliot-Fisk et al., supra note 2, at 229.
36. Treated effluent from the California side of the basin was first pumped 27 miles
over the mountains into Indian Creek Reservoir, located in the heart of the Washoe-native
land. It is now pumped into the Harvey Place Reservoir in Alpine County. North Lake
Tahoe pumps its effluent to Martis Valley near Truckee, while communities on the Nevada
side pump their effluent to Carson City. STRONG, supra note 28, at 66.
34.

37. See LAKE TAHOE AREA COUNCIL, EPA, EUTROPHICATION OF SURFACE WATERS-LAKE
TAHOE (1971).
38. JAMES E. PEPPER & ROBERT E. JORGENSEN, EPA, INFLUENCES OF WASTEWATER
MANAGEMENT ON LAND USE: TAHOE BASIN, 1950-1972, at 34 (1974).

39. See id. (discussing the development impacts of sewers in the Lake Tahoe Basin from
1950-1972).
40.

See LAKE

TAHOE JOINT STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE LAKE TAHOE JOINT STUDY

COMMITrFEE 8 (1967).
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representative from each state, three at large members from each state,
one presidential appointee, and a member from each of the six local
governments. Decisions would be made using simple majority voting.
In response to these recommendations, California, Nevada, and
Congress created an interstate compact to develop a regional agency.1 In
1969, after two years of negotiations, the Tahoe Regional Planning
Compact (the Compact) created the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
(TRPA). 42 The TRPA was charged with overseeing land use planning and
minimizing development impacts. The agency maintained environmental standards, issued development permits, and helped attain federal
and state air and water quality standards.
The Compact's negotiation significantly changed the LTJSC's
recommendations. Rather than a mix of state level representatives, local
officials dominated the TRPA's governing board and its advisory
planning commission (APC). Projects would be approved if not acted
upon within 60 days. Denial of a permit required a "double-majority" or
a majority vote of each state's representatives to reject a project. Local
governments provided the TRPA with a budget of $150,000, while the
LTJSC recommended giving the TRPA the right to levy additional
property taxes.43
While negotiating the Compact, Nevada and California created
independent county-funded interim agencies, the Nevada Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency (NTRPA) and the California Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency (CTRPA). The formation of the two state agencies
removed some control over development from the locally dominated
TRPA. The NTRPA and the CTRPA were immediately immersed in the
conflict surrounding the TRPA's creation, and, over the next six years,
Placer, El Dorado and Douglas counties withheld funds from the two
agencies and challenged their constitutionality without success. The
presence of the competing NTRPA and CTRPA alongside the newly
created TRPA also increased tensions between California and Nevada."
The TRPA began its operations in March 1970 with five staff
members.4" The governing board and an APC managed the TRPA. The

41. Interstate compacts are legally binding agreements between two or more states and
the U.S. Congress created to address problems that transcend state lines. The process of
interstate compact creation is often lengthy since all parties must agree to a common
compact and it can only be amended if all parties to the original compact approve the
amendments. See generally PAUL T. HARDY, INTERSTATE COMPACTS: THE TIES THAT BIND
(1982).
42. Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, Pub. L. No. 91-148, 83 Stat. 360 (1969); Pub. L.
No. 96-551, 94 Stat. 3233 (1980).
43. INGRAM & SABATIER, supra note 23, at 26-27.
44. Id. at 37-38.
45. By way of contrast, the TRPA's staff is now around 50 people.
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Compact required the TRPA to develop the regional plan in 15 months,
but the process was hindered by both time and resource constraints. The
TRPA sought input from federal, state, and local entities as well as
universities, the public, and the U.S. Forest Service (USFS). Simultaneously, they were responsible for processing a large number of permit
applications.4
The first regional plan was the "J.K. Smith Plan." It was based on
the Bailey Land Capability System." The system ranked all land in the
basin in terms of sensitivity as measured by slope and soil type. Land
capability was correlated to maximum allowed impervious coverage."'
When unveiled, the J.K. Smith Plan met intense criticism and the APC
declined to recommend it to the governing board. Some thought the plan
would have dire economic consequences and impinge upon property
rights, development, and local governments' ability to generate the
property tax revenue necessary to pay off sewer and utility bonds.
Others questioned whether the TRPA would be willing to follow staff
recommendations.49
In response to anti-plan sentiment, the governing board funded
an ad hoc committee chaired by Richard Heikka, Placer County Planning
Director, and the planning officers from the City of South Lake Tahoe
and Placer and El Dorado counties. The resulting "Heikka Plan" was
similar to the J.K. Smith Plan in many respects; however, while it
incorporated the Bailey Land Capability System, it changed zoning and
decreased density in a smaller portion of private land and did not
sharply curtail development. The population capacity of the Heikka Plan
was set at 280,000 people, while J.K. Smith's was set at a more modest
136,000. An added measure of the Heikka Plan was the public
acquisition of 34,000 acres of private, environmentally sensitive land,
provided that government funding of $50 to $100 million could be
obtained. The TRPA approved the Heikka Plan in February 1971. Due
to its emphasis on a relatively new land capabilities system, its adoption
received widespread national attention. Public support for the TRPA
also remained high, although some organizations began to doubt

46.
47.

STRONG, supra note 24, at 149.
See generally ROBERT G. BAILEY, DEP'T OF AGRIc. & TAHOE REG'L PLANNING

AGENCY, LAND-CAPABILITY CLASSIFICATION OF THE LAKE TAHOE BASIN, CALIFORNIANEVADA: A GUIDE FOR PLANNING (1974).

48. Impervious coverage is defined as any surface that does not permit the growth of
vegetation or precipitation to reach the soil. Examples of impervious surfaces include
roads, buildings, driveways, and wooden decks. A land capability rating of 1 or 2 allowed
only one percent impervious coverage to be constructed on the site while the other
extreme, 7, allows the construction of 30 percent impervious coverage.
49. Id. (citing STRONG, supranote 28, at 70-71).
50. Id. (citing SABATIER & PELKEY, supra note 28, at 35-36).
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whether the Agency would have the ability to implement the plan
effectively. 5'
Disillusionment with the TRPA (1972-1980)
In order to enforce the Heikka Plan, the TRPA passed a new land
use ordinance in 1972. The ordinance did not strictly follow the Bailey
system and some areas were totally exempt from its requirements. 2
More troubling was TRPA's approval of 99 percent of all development
applications during the first 15 months, resulting in 13,500 additional
housing units. In part, this was due to the dominance of local
government representatives on the governing board and APC, as well as
the TRPA's permitting procedures. Some of the more controversial
decisions included approval of the following: a major expansion of
Harrah's Casino (1971);. the North Shore Mall at Tahoe Vista (1973); the
expansion of Harvey's Resort Hotel (1973); and the Park Tahoe HotelCasino (1973). 53 TRPA approved these projects using either the 60-day no
action rule or the double-majority voting rule, which required a majority
of each state's representatives to reject a project. Given these voting rules
and local government dominance, projects were rarely rejected. This left
many environmental groups disappointed and angry.
During this period, the public simultaneously accused the TRPA
of being too stringent and too lax when it came to regulating development. "Some felt the new regulations resulted in an unconstitutional
taking of property without compensation, and filed lawsuits against the
TRPA totaling $260 million.", 4 Three counties withheld their funding for
the agency, openly questioning the constitutionality of requiring local
funding. Similarly, the State of California threatened to discontinue the
TRPA's funding, because it saw the agency as too development-friendly,
while many of the local governments in the basin resented the
restrictions on increasing their tax base.
California strengthened the CTRPA by re-instituting its funding.
The CTRPA drafted a more restrictive land use plan and ordinances for
the California portion of the basin. The CTRPA plan would regulate all
development on parcels greater than one acre. If a significant environmental impact occurred, a permit would not be granted. During this
51. Id.
52. Coverage of impervious surface in tourist commercial areas could reach 50 percent
while in the general commercial districts it could reach 70 percent. Nearly all single-family
residences with prior local government approval were exempt from TRPA review. Id.
53. Kauneckis et al., supra note 5, at 31 (citing INGRAM & SABATIER, supra note 23, at 3536).
54. Id. (citing Tahoe Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 34 F.3d 753
(9th Cir. 1994)).
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period, the CTRPA took on an additional role as a parallel watchdog
agency. It filed an unsuccessful lawsuit against the TRPA for its approval
of the North Shore Club Casino."5
The basin's increasing environmental problems were documented in a 1979 report by the Western Federal Regional Council
entitled Lake Tahoe Environmental Assessment. It reported the following
trends from 1970 to 1978:
* Algal concentrations had increased 150 percent;
* Urban Development had increased 78 percent; and,
* 75 percent of marshes, 15 percent of forests, and 50
percent of meadowlands had been converted to urban use
or had been destroyed.The TRPA also conducted its own self-evaluation. However,
local governments opposed all of the TRPA's recommended changes.
California continued to argue for more stringent regulations while
Nevada favored additional development. By 1975, California and
Nevada passed separate state legislation amending the Compact. The
next five years involved considerable negotiation and conflict over
redesigning the TRPA. At one point, California cut off the TRPA's
funding in response to the Nevada legislature's rejection of its proposed
amendments. Political leadership and support for the amendments
waned and some California legislators proposed federal management
7 for
Area.
Recreation
National
Tahoe
Lake
a
creating
the entire basin by
The two states eventually agreed to an amended Compact in
December 1980." Among other things, the revised compact directed the
TRPA to establish Environmental Threshold Carrying Capacities
(ETCCs) within 18 months. The ETCCs were a set of environmental
Id. (citing INGRAM & SABATIER, supra note 23, at 38).
Id. (citing STRONG, supra note 24, at 187).
As Kauneckis et al. relate,
The potential for federal management of the entire basin has not been an
idle threat. At the height of the TRPA's criticism in the 1970s, the main
central valley newspaper, The Sacramento Bee, suggested that perhaps the
time had come to let the federal government take control of the entire
basin. There have also been five attempts to make Lake Tahoe a National
Park and two attempts to give it status as a National Lakeshore or Scenic
Area. The first occurred in 1900 by a Nevada Senator and failed under
public outcry against proposed compensation to timber barons who had
profited from denuding the timber from surrounding mountains. Two
attempts in 1913 and 1918 were brought down by local landowners. Bills
introduced in 1931 and 1935 were both opposed by coalitions of local
development interests.
Kauneckis et al., supra note 5, at 15-16 (citing STRONG, supra note 23, at 175, 68, 80,81).
58. See generally INGRAM & SABATIER, supra note 23, at 57-62 (discussing the politics
surrounding the Compact's revisions).
55.
56.
57.
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quality targets designed to direct and monitor the performance of the
agency and its programs. The TRPA was required to amend its Regional
Plan and enact ordinances to ensure the ETCCs would be met.
Previously exempt activities would now be subject to the TRPA's
regulatory authority. Furthermore, all new subdivisions, Planned Unit
Developments (PUDs), condominiums, and new casinos or expansions
were prohibited until the Regional Plan and ordinances were completed.
The revised Compact also prohibited any sewage plant expansions.
The revised Compact modified the membership of the governing
board and the APC as well. The governing board was expanded to 15
members, and the overall ratio of state to local officials was changed
from four to three [see Table 4]; whereas, under the original Compact
local officials held a three to two majority. The governing board's voting
decision rules also changed. In order to approve a project, five members
from the state where the project is located and nine members overall
must vote to approve it. The no-action period resulting in automatic
approval increased from 60 to 180 days. The APC expanded to 19
through the addition of four non-local members. The APC's membership
included both professional staff in planning and natural resource
management and lay members representing the public. Additional input
comes from various working groups that the TRPA organizes and/or
participating agencies.
Table 4: Current Structure of the TRPA's Governing Board
California Local Government
Nevada Local Government
City of South Lake Tahoe Council *
Carson City Supervisor
Member
*
Douglas County Commissioner
*
El Dorado County Supervisor
Washoe County Commissioner
*
Placer County Supervisors'
Appointee
California State Representatives
Nevada State Representatives
*
California Assembly Speaker
Designee for the Director of Nevada
Appointee
Dept. of Conservation and Natural
California Senate Rules Committee
Resources
Appointee
*
Governor of Nevada Appointee
*
Governor of California Appointee
*
Nevada At-Large Member
*
Governor of California Appointee
Nevada Secretary of State
Presidential Appointee, Non-voting member

While the negotiated Compact satisfied federal and state
legislators, TRPA lost some of its most ardent supporters during the
reorganization. Moreover, the revised compact spurred other
stakeholder interests to organize and respond to the stricter land use
regulations. It was during this period that the Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council and the Gaming Alliance were created to represent private
landowners and business interests respectively; both organizations
played important roles in transforming basin governance.
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The Decade of Negotiation (1980-1989)
The TRPA's Regional Plan now guides all decisions in the
watershed pertaining to growth and development. It includes a
comprehensive land use plan; a plan for the development of a regional
transportation system; a plan for the development, utilization, and
management of the basin's recreational resources; and a plan for the
location, scale, and provision of public services and facilities. The revised
Compact required the TRPA to amend its Regional Plan so that "at a
minimum the plan and all of its elements, as implemented through
agency ordinances, rules and regulations, achieves and maintains the
adopted environmental threshold carrying capacities. Each element of
the plan shall contain implementation provisions and time schedules for
such implementation by ordinance." 9
Given the conflict surrounding the original Regional Plan and the
Compact's revisions, it should not be surprising that developing a new
Regional Plan produced a great deal of conflict. The TRPA placed a
moratorium on new housing in 1981 until the new Regional Plan was
adopted and only issued development permits essential to public health
and safety. The moratorium created strong divisions between groups
favoring development and private property rights and those favoring
development restrictions and increased environmental protection. The
creation of formal organizations representing each side of the conflict,
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council and Gaming Alliance and the League
to Save Lake Tahoe, made the issue of development versus environmental protection more salient. California state agencies favored greater
restrictions on development, while those of Nevada typically supported
development interests. The TRPA attempted to resolve these conflicts
through formal' and informal meetings with various governmental and
nongovernmental actors and additional input was received from
members of the APC, the Steering Committee, and the Governing Board
when developing the draft plan. In 1983, An Environmental Impact
Statement for Adoption of a Regional Plan for the Lake Tahoe Basin was
released for public comment.
The TRPA's 1984 Regional Plan encountered resistance when it
was released for public comment. The League to Save Lake Tahoe and
the California Attorney General immediately sued the agency for not
providing adequate protection. In People of the State of Californiav. Tahoe
Regional PlanningAgency, California argued that the 1984 Regional Plan
did not conform to the Compact because it did not ensure that the newly

59. Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-551, art. V, § 1(c), 94 Stat. 3233
(1980).
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formulated ETCCs would be achieved6 In August 1983, a federal district
court judge issued an injunction preventing the TRPA from approving
the plan. In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, the Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council filed suit on behalf of 700
landowners, arguing that the moratorium and the 1984 Regional Plan
resulted in an unconstitutional taking of property without just
compensation.6'
The moratorium on all development in the basin not only
prevented new housing and tourism development, but it also halted
environmentally friendly projects-redevelopment and environmental
mitigation projects. This created an incentive for all parties to negotiate a
new regional plan. However, initial attempts by the TRPA, the League,
and the California Attorney General failed. At one point, the State of
Nevada became so frustrated that a bill was introduced in the state
legislature to end its participation in the Compact. While unsuccessful, it
sent a clear message that a new regional plan would have to be approved
by January 1987 or Nevada would pull out of the Compact.
The situation improved in 1985 when Bill Morgan, formerly with
the U.S. Forest Service's Lake Tahoe Basin Management Unit (LTBMU),
became the TPRA's Executive Director. The situation at the time was
described as a "war zone," with property rights advocates and
development interests pitted against those favoring tighter regulatory
controls. People active in the debate reported that bumper stickers
favoring environmental protection created a setting for vandalism and
confrontation. Morgan made a brave effort to resolve the dispute by
instituting a dispute resolution process known as the ConsensusBuilding Workshop (CBW). The objective was to bring together the
basin's major stakeholders to negotiate solutions for critical issues at the
center of the conflict and reach agreement.
The TRPA hired a professional facilitator to direct a series of
meetings over the next year. Initially, skepticism surrounded the consensus process. However, as one participant observed, "Attitudes slowly
changed. Provisional agreements emerged. Delicately balanced treaties
were constructed. Guidelines for new ordinances were worked out and
finally agreed to." 62 Most participants reported that this represented a
major turning point. The process produced complex tradeoffs and

60. California v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 766 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir. 1985).
61. In Tahoe-Sierra PreservationCouncil v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302
(2002), the Supreme Court recently held that the moratorium the TRPA put in place did not
constitute a taking of property without just compensation. The decision did not address the
constitutionality of the Individual Parcel Evaluation System, an issue subject to ongoing
litigation.
62. STRONG, supra note 28, at 88.
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compromises that include many of the 1987 Regional Plan's unique
features:
8 Each community's development plans would be
approved by the TRPA and consistent with its ordinances;
" No new subdivisions were permitted;
" New commercial development was limited to 400,000
square feet over the first ten years;
0 Only 200 additional tourist accommodation units were
allowed for the first ten years;
M Disturbances in high sensitivity areas (according to the
Bailey system, 1-3 capability lands) were prohibited with
few exemptions;
E Allocations for new single and multiple-family
residential units were limited to 350 per year for a six-year
period;
0 A new system of zoning protections was created for
environmental resources such as Stream
critical
Environment Zones (SEZ);63
0 All new development projects with water quality
impacts were required to mitigate these impacts using best
management practices (BMPs);
0 The Individual Parcel Evaluation System (IPES) was
created, ranking all residential lots in the basin in terms of
their environmental sensitivity;" which was linked to,

63. Stream environment zones (SEZs) include wetlands, floodplains, or riparian zones
and have low Individual Parcel Evaluation System (IPES) scores due to the vital
importance of undisturbed streams in filtering nutrients that are otherwise deposited into
the lake. Parcels located entirely within an SEZ's setback area receive an IPES score of zero.
Kauneckis et al., supra note 5, at 36; See generally TAHOE REG'L PLANNING AGENCY, CODE OF
ORDINANCES, ch. 37, subpart 3 (1999), available at http://www.trpa.org/Ordinances/
pdffiles/Code37.pdf (last visited Oct. 20,2003).
64. The IPES applies to undeveloped residential parcels. Non-residential and
developed parcels remain subject to the original Bailey Land Capability System. The goal of
the IPES is to provide a more objective and accurate classification of the suitability of a
residential parcel's development potential. All 17,000 undeveloped residential parcels are
assigned a numerical score based on eight site characteristics. Scores range from 0 to 1150.
Those with the highest scores can be developed after receiving a building permit from a
local government. The IPES sets a total development cap of 300 parcels per year, which is
divided among the counties and incorporated areas to regulate both the location and pace
of development. Kauneckis et al., supra note 5, at 36 (citing TAHOE REG'L PLANNING
AGENCY, BEYOND BAILEY: TRPA's INDIVIDUAL PARCEL EVALUATION SYSTEM (Sept. 1988)).
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0 A Transferable Development Rights (TDR) Program that
allowed development rights to be sold or banked from
environmentally sensitive lands to usable locations.65
The resulting regulatory framework may be one of the most
complex and environmentally restrictive of its kind in operation. While
some consensus was reached, the tradeoffs remained far from ideal from
any individual group's perspective. Consequently, the Regional Plan
remains a source of litigation. 66
One of the key features of the new plan was the Environmental
Threshold Carrying Capacities' (ETCCs) environmental performance
targets. The TRPA adopted nine ETCCs in 1982 to address scenic,
recreational, water quality, air quality, noise, wildlife, soil conservation,
fisheries, and vegetation issues. 68 They included both numeric and
65. The initial interest in the TDR program stemmed from the development restrictions
imposed by the IPES. In order to build a residential unit, one needs a development
allocation, a development right, and appropriate coverage, all of which can be transferred.
Local governments are allocated a specific number of development allocations and decide
how to distribute their allocations among single and multi-family dwellings. Local
governments often fail to use their total allocations. Every residential parcel is also
assigned a development right that can be transferred within each of the watershed's nine
hydrological areas. An owner must have an appropriate amount of coverage, the amount
of impermeable surface on a parcel. Landowners wishing to acquire more coverage can
provide mitigation funds or transfer coverage from another parcel. The amount of coverage
that can be transferred varies and the rules are more stringent for commercial and tourist
accommodations than residential units in order to encourage the rehabilitation of
dilapidated structures and re-development. It is possible to purchase coverage; however,
the price is often prohibitive. According to one planner, about 1800 square-feet are needed
to build a single-family residence and the current market price is around $35 per squarefoot. Kauneckis et al., supra note 5, at 39-40.
66. See, e.g., Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997). Mrs. Suitum
was barred from building a retirement home on a small lot on the Nevada side that she and
her late husband acquired in 1972 because she received a low IPES score, which in effect
denied her the right to develop her property. She argued that she had been deprived of her
constitutional rights because she lost all use of her land. The TRPA argued that just
compensation had been offered because she was allowed to sell development rights. The
Supreme Court ruled in 1997 on a procedural issue and sent the case back without taking
up the substantive constitutional questions. The case was then settled for $515,000 as it was
about to go to trial in the U.S. District Court in Nevada. Kauneckis et al., supra note 5, at 21.
67. According to Kauneckis et al.,
The thresholds can be amended when scientific evidence and technical
information shows: two or more thresholds are mutually exclusive;
scientific evidence shows a basis for a threshold is non-existent; thresholds
cannot be achieved; additional thresholds are required to maintain a
significant value of the region; and a threshold is not sufficient to maintain
a significant value of the region. To date, no threshold has been amended.
Kauneckis et al., supra note 5, at 36.
68. Id. at 35 (citing TAHOE REG'L PLANNING AGENCY, REGIONAL PLAN FOR THE LAKE
TAHOE BASIN: GOALS AND POLICIES (1986), available at http://www.trpa.org/Goals/
preface.html (last visited Oct. 20,2003).
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qualitative standards. The TRPA reviews all projects to "ensure that the
project under review will not adversely affect implementation of the
regional plan and will not cause the adopted environmental threshold
69
carrying capacities (ETCCs) of the region to be exceeded."
Every five years, the TRPA undergoes a threshold review. This
requires collecting and analyzing all available data, evaluating progress
toward meeting the ETCCs, and making recommendations targeted at
reaching unmet goals by 2007. 70 A draft of the recent threshold
evaluation was issued in December 2001.71 The report notes that, of the
36 indicators, eight (25 percent) are in attainment and seven are close to
attainment (19.4 percent). Of the 25 indicators not in attainment, 12 show
a positive trend and seven have a negative trend.?
The threshold review process has had an important impact on
the governance system. While there may not be a shared vision of what
the lake should look like in the next decade, the review process helps
actors agree on what they do not want. As a member of the local business
community stated, "Ithink there is a common vision of what we don't
want and that becomes a very powerful motivator of what we do. " 7-The
threshold review process facilitates increased communication and
learning among basin interests.74 For example, the first two threshold
reviews demonstrated to many basin actors that a continued emphasis
on stringent land use regulations was unlikely to reverse declining water
clarity and that a greater emphasis on nonregulatory approaches such as
habitat restoration and BMPs was needed. Even though the TRPA's
existence was no longer in question, the lack of progress towards many
of the ETCCs created an incentive for basin actors to explore new
approaches to improving watershed governance.

69. Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-551, art. V, § l(g), 94 Stat. 3233
(1980).
70. "The date of 2007 emerged from the consensus building process following the 1984
suits. It was intended as a mechanism to force compliance by the TRPA." Kauneckis et al.,
supra note 5, at 15,74 n.56 (citing TAHOE REG'L PLANNING AGENCY, SUMMARY & DRAFT 1996
EVALUATION REPORT: ENV'T THRESHOLD CARRYING CAPACITIES & REG'L PLAN PACKAGE FOR
THE LAKE TAHOE REGION 1-3 (1996)).

71. See 2001 Threshold Evaluation, supra note 18.
72. Id. Executive Summary, at xvii.
73. Kauneckis et al., supra note 5, at 60.
74. See generally Paul A. Sabatier & Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, The Advocacy Coalition
Framework: An Assessment, in THEORIES OF THE POLICY PROCESS 117-66 (Paul A. Sabatier ed.,
1999); POLICY CHANGE AND LEARNING: AN ADVOCACY COALITION APPROACH (Paul A.
Sabatier & Hank C. Jenkins-Smith eds., 1993) (discussing the concept of policy oriented
learning).
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The Era of Collaboration (1989-Present)
The period of conflict surrounding the development of the
revised Compact and Regional Plan marked a critical turning point.
Environmental interests had effectively exercised their veto power by
blocking the 1984 Regional Plan. However, this came at a high cost. The
extended legal battles were costly. Environmental groups were unable to
get the courts to change the TRPA's policies. Conversely, while
development, casino interests, and local governments continued to
exercise their influence on the TRPA, they were similarly ineffective in
blocking TRPA policies that threatened their interests.
By the decade's end, a political stalemate emerged and many
influential governmental and nongovernmental organizations realized
that there had to be a better way to resolve their differences. One local
businessman summed up the situation:
Allright [sic], TRPA, you are not going to go away, we can't
sue you out of existence, we can't go to the Nevada or
California legislatures and legislate you out of business, we
can't go to the feds and have them do away with you, so we
will work with you. OK. That message got into the
community by '92. That cooperation was the way to go.75
Another observed, "If you have this process where everyone can
veto, what it becomes is an understanding that in order to get 'A' you
have to give up 'B'. As a whole we are going to get consensus because
everybody needs something, everybody wants something and
everybody is afraid of something." 76 Additionally, interest group leaders
involved in the lawsuits against the TRPA noted the high costs
associated with using the courts to try and block TRPA decisions. As one
respondent active in the litigation noted, "we don't want to go back to
the days of conflict. From our point of view it is better to accept some
things than go back to fighting... there is more to be gained from
cooperation."7
Interestingly, most of the respondents we interviewed failed to
identify the 1987 Regional Plan's approval as the turning point toward
more cooperative and collaborative approaches to watershed governance. While formal consensus building helped end the stalemate, many
remained unhappy with the Regional Plan's compromises. Instead,
respondents viewed the emergence of the Tahoe Transportation
Coalition and Water Quality Coalition in 1989 as the critical turning
75.
76.
77.

Kauneckis et al., supranote 5, at 56.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 55.
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point. While conflicts continued to exist, the level of antagonism declined
throughout the 1990s as organizations found new ways to work together.
The following sections describe various types of collaborative
relationships that enhanced watershed governance. They are divided
into three general sections. The first discusses the shift away from the
zero-sum games involving win-lose regulations to non-zero-sum games
involving win-win solutions such as habitat restoration. The second
section examines the creation of new funding opportunities through
increased collaboration. The third section discusses the increased
organizational linkages across governmental agencies and between
public and private entities.
MOVING FROM REGULATION TO RESTORATION
The political limitations of a purely regulatory approach led to a
renewed emphasis on non-regulatory policy instruments such as
wetland restoration projects, private land acquisition, creation of
stormwater detention basins, and other BMPs. These non-regulatory
instruments help decrease erosion, treat stormwater runoff, and protect
and restore habitat. There is a long history of non-regulatory approaches
to land and water management in the basin. For example, the USFS's
Erosion Control Grants Program has provided financial assistance to
local governments for water quality improvements. Between 1984 and
1997, $9.6 million in federal funds were spent on restoration efforts with
an additional $24 million in matching funds coming from local
in
governments.78 The USFS also acquired more than $100 million
the Santini-Burton Act.7
through
parcels
private
sensitive
ecologically
The California Tahoe Conservancy (CTC) also acquires and restores
lands. The CTC has provided more than $175 million to federal, state,
and local agencies for over 375 restoration and water quality
improvement projects. More than 5450 undeveloped and environmentally sensitive private parcels have been acquired covering more
than 6000 acres on the California side of the basin. The agency acquires
as many sites as possible on a willing-seller basis.

78. See generally CAL. TAHOE CONSERVANCY, CALIFORNIA TAHOE CONSERVANCY:
PROGRESS REPORT (1997) (providing project expenditures authorized by the California
Tahoe Conservancy since 1984). See generally Richard Fink, Public Land Acquisition for
Environmental Protection:Structuringa Programfor the Lake Tahoe Basin, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 485
(1991).
79. The Santini-Burton Act, Pub. L. No. 96-586, 94 Stat. 3381 (1980) authorized the sale
of Bureau of Land Management lands near Las Vegas, Nevada, and used the proceeds to
acquire environmentally sensitive lands in the Lake Tahoe Basin with low IPES scores.
80. CAL. TAHOE CONSERVANCY, supra note 78, at 3, 15.
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Restoration efforts have expanded considerably in recent years.
For example, the TRPA established a Best Management Practices (BMP)
Retrofit Program. While new development is required to install
appropriate BMPs, the voluntary BMP Retrofit Program encourages
existing residential units to install BMPs such as re-vegetation or
stabilizing slopes to reduce runoff. In return, the TRPA provides
education, technical assistance, and low interest loans to encourage
landowner participation. 8' Commercial, recreational, and public
landowners are also required to implement BMPs. They must have a
TRPA-approved BMP plan or receive a waste discharge permit from the
regional board. Working in cooperation with agencies such as the
Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS), the BMP Retrofit
Program's aim is to have all property owners implement BMPs by
October 2011.82
In part, this shift in focus from regulatory to nonregulatory
solutions was due to the disappointing results of the first two threshold
reviews. The reviews suggested that regulations alone would not
improve Lake Tahoe's water quality since many of the current
environmental problems existed due to development and poor land use
planning decisions during the past few decades. Respondents also
attributed this shift in attitude to the leadership of the TRPA director,
who was hired in 1994. While the previous TRPA director laid the
groundwork for increased interagency collaboration, the new director
changed the agency's underlying philosophy from "regulation is the
answer" to "project is the fix" by placing additional emphasis on
working with other organizations to implement non-regulatory solutions
to basin problems. Today, the TRPA is much more willing to share credit
for the collaborative activities with other agencies and to allow groups
such as the Lake Tahoe Transportation and Water Quality Coalition to
take a leadership role. This is very different from the early days of the
TRPA when the agency was more likely to see its role as directing the
activities of other public agencies, acting as a regulator of the regulators.
These shifts in philosophy have helped to encourage other organizations
to become involved in proactive partnerships focused on redevelopment
and restoration.

81. See generally SOIL CONSERVATION SER., DEP'T. OF AGRIC., S. LAKE TAHOE, CAL.,
EVALUATION OF PROPOSED EROSION CONTROL PROJECTS WITHIN NEVADA'S LAKE TAHOE
WATERS: THE COST EFFECTIVENESS OF REDUCING THE SEDIMENT ON LAKE TAHOE (1990).
82. TAHOE REG'L PLANNING AGENCY, A PROPERTY OWNER'S GUIDE TO IMPROVING
WATER QUALITY 2 (n.d.).
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Leveraging New Resources through Collaboration
While notable, the Environmental Improvement Program
(EIP)-a collection of projects and programs designed to systematically
address the watershed's environmental problems over the next 20
years-dwarfs these collaborative restoration efforts in scale, scope, and
magnitude. 3 Basin actors had discussed developing a program similar to
the EIP for years. However, it took the 1997 Presidential Summit
attended by President Clinton and other top federal and state officials to
make the EIP a reality. As one participant stated, "with the presidential
summit, we had everyone's attention at once. We started the EIP six
months before the President got here."4 This provided the incentive for
agency directors to complete a document to present at the Summit in
hopes of securing a federal funding commitment. The TRPA coordinated
the EIP's development, receiving input from a wide range of organiza8
tions involved in various aspects of its implementation. The result is a
partnership consisting of a large number of governmental and
nongovernmental organizations focused on a coordinated effort to
achieve the ETCCs and stop declining lake clarity [Table 5]. The TRPA
merely serves as the coordinating entity.6
The draft EIP was completed in time for the Lake Tahoe
Presidential Forum (known locally as the Presidential Summit) held in
July 1997. President Clinton, Vice President Gore, the governors of
California and Nevada, four senators, several members of Congress, four
Cabinet-level secretaries and administrators, and dozens of high-ranking
federal, state, and local officials attended the event. It involved a series of
events and community workshops organized by public, private, and
tribal organizations framed around water quality, transportation, forest
87
ecosystems, restoration, recreation, and tourism issues.

83. TAHOE REG'L PLANNING AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM, VOL.
1: PROGRAM OVERVIEW (MAY 2001) [hereinafter EIP VOL. 1], available at http://www.trpa.org
eipdocument/pdffiles/volume I .pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2003).
84. Kauneckis et al., supranote 5, at 42.
85. See TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY (TRPA), ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT
PROGRAM FOR THE LAKE TAHOE REGION: THE COOPERATIVE EFFORT TO PRESERVE, RESTORE,
AND ENHANCE THE UNIQUE NATURAL AND HUMAN ENVIRONMENT OF THE LAKE TAHOE

REGION, VOL. 1: PROGRAM OVERVIEW 5 (2001), available at http://www.trpa.org/
eipdocument/pdffiles/volumel.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2003).; See also EIP VOL. 1, supra
note 83, app. A.
86. LAKE TAHOE FED. P'SHIP, REVIEW OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM
FOR THE LAKE TAHOE REGION 2 (1999).
87. LAKE TAHOE FED. INTERAGENCY P'SHIP, PRESIDENTIAL FORUM DELIVERABLES 1

(1997).
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Table 5: Selected Organizations and Their EIP Involvement
Participant

Regional Agencies
Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency
Tahoe Transportation
District
South Shore Trans.
Mgt. Assoc.
Truckee North Tahoe
Transportation
Management
Association
Federal Agencies
Environmental
Protection Agency
U.S. Forest Service
Soil conservation
Service
Army Corps of
Engineers
U.S. Postal Service
Bureau of Reclamation
U.S. Geological Survey
Federal Highways
Administration
Federal Transit
Administration
State Agencies
CA Department of
Transportation
CA State Water Quality
Control Board
CA Air Resources
Board
California State Lands
California State Parks
California Tahoe
Conservancy
Nevada Dept. of
Transportation
Nevada Division of
State Parks
NV Division of Envtl.
Protection
Nevada Division of
State Lands
Local Governments
City of South Lake
Tahoe (and
Redevelopment
agency)

Improvement

Area of Participation
Programs
Studies
Regulation

x

x

x

x
x

x
x

x
x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x
x

x
x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

Financing

Fall 2003]

(Table 5 Continued)
Participant
Douglas County
Carlson County
El Dorado County
Placer County (and
Redevelpmn't agency)
Washoe County
Washoe Tribe
Douglas County Sewer
Improvement District
Incline Village
Improvement District
North Tahoe Public
Utility District
South Tahoe Public
Utility District
Tahoe City Public
Utility District
Nevada Tahoe
Conservation District
Tahoe Resource
Conservation District
Private Entities
Heavenly Ski Resort
Homeowners Assocs.
Residential Property
Owners
Commercial Property
Owners
N. Lake Tahoe Resort
Association
Academic Institutions
Univ. of Cal. - Davis
Univ. of Nev. - Reno
Desert Res. Institute
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Improvement
X
X
X

Area of Participation
Regulation
Studies
Programs
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X

X
X

Financing
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X

X
X
X

X
X
X

The Presidential Summit provided a major focusing event with
several positive effects. First, the event provided the opportunity for
governmental and nongovernmental officials to discuss basin problems.
Second, as a high profile media event, it educated the public about
declining water quality problems. Finally, it increased momentum and
political support for the EIP. This resulted in an initial doubling of
federal funding for Lake Tahoe over a two-year period.' It also proved
how much could be accomplished by working together."
88.

TAHOE REG'L PLANNING

AGENCY,

ANNUAL

REPORT OF THE TAHOE REGIONAL

PLANNING AGENCY 2 (1998).
89. While respondents supported the concept of a coordinated basin-wide EIP, some
expressed concern that it has grown into nothing more than an agency "wish-list" of
projects without much effort to prioritize or target the impacts. Others are critical that there
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In 2001, the EIP was revised and updated based on additional
stakeholder input and technical improvements that made it easier to
monitor and track implementation. It now includes a comprehensive
financing plan that identifies multi-agency funding needs9 The updated
EIP identified over 700 projects and programs needed to meet the ETCCs
and the organizations responsible for each activity in order to improve
accountability. Even a casual review of the proposed activities reveals
that most are inherently collaborative. 9' As one agency director observed,
"there are few projects that can be done by just one agency."92
The EIP identifies almost $1.5 billion worth of projects within the
20-year timeframe 1997-2016. 93 The 1998 EIP emphasized approximately
$908 million in capital project expenditures during an initial ten-year
period (1997-2006), with costs shared between federal, state, and local
governments, and the private sector. These costs are summarized in
Table 6. The 2001 EIP contains a better estimate of other EIP costs and
modifies the timeframes. For example, there is now a ten-year
investment strategy and a 15-year construction goal for capital projects
since project development lags several years behind the allocation of
funding. The timeframes for the research and studies, program and
technical assistance, and operations and maintenance categories vary as
well.94
Steps are being taken to secure the EIP's $1.5 billion budget by
2016. 95 In November 2000, Congress passed the Lake Tahoe Restoration
Act, which authorizes ten years of appropriations providing the federal
share of the EIP's costs. 96 States have had some success in securing a
has been no effort to systematically review the projects and their overall environmental
impacts to ensure that they will achieve the environmental thresholds. A few respondents
also suggested that the widespread support that the EIP enjoys may change once the
individual projects are implemented because those affected by the projects may voice
opposition. For example, one informant noted that property owners in the Tahoe Keys
Condominium complex are beginning to debate the CTC's large-scale restoration of the
Upper Truckee River. Current debates over shorezone ordinances illustrate a potential
source of controversy. Kauneckis et al., supra note 5, at 46.
90. TAHOE REG'L PLANNING AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM, VOL.
3: FINANCE PLAN (Apr. 2001) [hereinafter EIP VOL. III], available at http://www.
trpa.org/eipdocument/pdffiles/volume3.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2003).
91. See TAHOE REG'L PLANNING AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM,
VOL. 2: MASTER LIST OF THRESHOLD NEEDS (Apr. 2001) [hereinafter EIP VOL. II], available at
http://www.trpa.org/eipdocument/pdffiles/volume2.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2003);
TAHOE REG'L PLANNING AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM, VOL. 4:
ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORT (Apr. 2001) [hereinafter EIP VOL. IV), available at http://www.
trpa.org/eipdocument/pdffiles/volume4.pdf. (last visited Oct. 20, 2003).
92. Kauneckis et al., supra note 5, at 55.
93. EIP VOL. III, supra note 90, at 3.
94. EIP VOL. I, supra note 83, at 6.
95. EIP VOL. III, supra note 90, at 1.
96. Lake Tahoe Restoration Act, Pub. L. No.106-506, § 7(5), 114 Stat. 2351 (2003).
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portion of their share of EIP funding. California appropriated
approximately $42 million towards implementing the EIP. In March
2000, state voters approved Proposition 12, a $2.1 billion park bond
measure that will also help fund a number of EIP projects. In June 1999,
the Nevada State Assembly approved a bill authorizing up to $56.4
million in bonds as Nevada's share, although their sale is contingent on
the relative strength of the state's economy. Funding from existing state
programs will also fund part of the states' share of EIP costs. It is less
97
clear where the local governments will find their share of EIP funding.
Table 6: Ten-Year EIP Project Capital Needs, 1997-2006 (in millions, 1997$)
Total $
Federal
State of
State of
Local
Private
Threshold
(millions)
Govt.
Nevada
California
Govt.
Sector
Program
Water
Quality
Soil
Conservation
Air Quality
Vegetation
Wildlife
Fisheries
Recreation
Scenic
Total

75

41

88

30.4

116.2

350.6

1.2

11.2

74.2

12.9

93.2

192.7

28.1
6
0
9.9
10.8
21.7

22
0
1.3
9.2
9.8
6.5

41.8
7.2
3.6
20.4
35.2
4.7

19.5
5.6
1.2
5.9
4.2
2.3

17.7
23.8
11.1
20.4
10.1
4.7

129.1
42.6
17.2
65.8
70.1
39.9

152.7

101

275.1

82

297.2

908

There has also been progress in implementing the EIP. Over $80
million in capital projects have been funded by local (21.3 percent), state
(43.8 percent), and federal (26 percent) agencies and private organizations (8.9 percent)."' Over $4 million have been spent on science
programs. Twenty-one technical assistance efforts were completed at a
cost of over $3 million." Collectively, approximately nine percent of the
EIP's projects have been completed. Moreover, the planning that
occurred during the last three years provides a strong foundation for
implementation efforts over the next few years. The expectation is that
the pace of implementation will quicken and that future projects will be
implemented more efficiently now that the organizations responsible for
implementing the projects have learned to work together and design
projects. °° Over $185 million in projects were planned for 2001 and
almost $200 million in projects were scheduled for both 2002 and 2003.'0
97. Under state law, local governments are limited in their ability to raise the revenue
required for their share of the EIP's costs. EIP VOL. III, supra note 90, at 4.
98. Id. at 20.
99. Id. at 3,17.
100. Id. at 22.
101. Id. app., at A6.

1040

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 43

The EIP is clearly an ambitious long-term effort to both expand and
coordinate environmental projects and development.
The success of the EIP remains unknown and will be subject to
the vagaries of changing political and economic conditions. Nevertheless, the progress that has been made is impressive. These accomplishments highlight a new phase of collaboration to improve watershed
management. A decade earlier, the same organizations that were
embedded in a nearly constant state of political and legal conflict are
now working on joint projects and coordinating programs.
NEW ORGANIZATIONAL LINKAGES
Collaborative interorganizational relationships have also
emerged to enhance watershed governance. This includes new
relationships between nongovernmental organizations as exemplified by
the Tahoe Transportation and Water Quality Coalition, governmental
organizations and business interests, and improved relationships
between various governmental organizations. The following sections
summarize these collaborative relationships and provide examples of the
various ways these relationships improved watershed governance.
The Tahoe Transportation and Water Quality Coalition
The Tahoe Transportation and Water Quality Coalition (the
Coalition) was initially established in 1989 as the Tahoe Transportation
Coalition to develop a stronger basin transit program. It consists of a
loose coalition of basin actors who traditionally were fierce opponents on
many basin issues. It initially included The League to Save Lake Tahoe
(The League), The Gaming Alliance, and The Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council. The local press immediately dubbed it the "unholy alliance"
due to the organizations' opposing views. As one respondent who is a
member of the Coalition stated, "We
were three points to a triangle and
' 2
we represented different interests. ,1
Respondents favorably recounted the creation of the coalition.
After a typical meeting with the TRPA, the three groups found themselves at a common table complaining about the agency. Reportedly, the
director of The Gaming Alliance asked the other directors if there was an
issue they all could agree upon. They all agreed that transportation was
an important problem. Casino and ski interests wanted to address the
problem for economic reasons. The League believed it was an important
environmental issue involving both congestion and air quality. The

102.

Kauneckis et al., supra note 5, at 22.
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Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council viewed it as a quality of life issue for
basin residents. The three organizations pooled their efforts toward
finding solutions. Over time, common agreement expanded to address
water quality issues. The Coalition's membership has also expanded to
include representatives of the ski industry, chambers of commerce,
private-property rights groups, environmental organizations, and casino
operators.
Many factors contributed to the Coalition's emergence. The
Coalition built upon the trust developed between organizations during
the CBW. One NGO director observed, "there is still consensus building
during coalition building, but the early meetings are what really built
03
that cooperation and now we have many more focused subgroups."
Another interest group leader reported that, "after several years of
working together, we started building up some level of trust amongst the
executive directors of various groups."'O' While participants built
relationships and developed expectations and trust in each other, they
continued to use the full range of options, from public protest to the
court system. However, through increased communication, the
organizations found creative ways to link seemingly disparate issues
(e.g., transportation, economic redevelopment, and environmental
improvements) in ways that produced win-win or at least win-no-lose
situations (i.e., non-zero sum games). What emerged was a mutual
understanding that cooperation could be pursued in some areas, while
disagreement remained on other issues. As one interest group leader
noted, "on some issues we agree and on others we sue."' °5 Essentially,
the partners learned how to collaborate in ways that were mutually
beneficial while respecting their disagreements on other issues.
Respondents also cited leadership as an important factor.
Respondents gave credit to the directors of the League and the Gaming
Alliance for creating the Tahoe Transportation Coalition. The League
had seen a recent change in directors and showed a new willingness to
negotiate that marked a dramatic shift from its previous positions. A
change in the directors at The League paralleled a new willingness to
negotiate, marking a dramatic shift. The then director of the Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council, now Director of the Gaming Alliance, initiated the
coalition. He had been a local newspaper columnist and, as a vocal critic
of the TRPA, brought considerable social capital to the new coalition.
The Coalition illustrates the strong role that NGOs can play in
watershed governance. The Coalition is effectively lobbying the federal

103.
104.
105.

Id.at 55.
Id. at 57.
Id.
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government on a variety of issues."6 In 1994, the Coalition began
concentrating on getting additional federal support for transportation
and other issues by creating the Lake Tahoe Joint Federal Legislation
Agenda. Prior to this, each organization had its own agenda and they
typically were in conflict. Through the Joint Federal Legislation Agenda,
diverse organizations coordinate their lobbying by focusing on common
issues and communicating shared priorities. Coalition members
recounted the amazement of congressional representatives when they
saw these diverse groups lobbying for common goals. Thus far, these
coordinated lobbying efforts have been quite effective. For example, the
Coalition recently obtained $2.5 million to assist in coordinating public
transportation along the southern shore.
Collaboration between Government and Business
The creation of the Coalition marked an important development
in Lake Tahoe's governance. For the first time, NGOs exercised
leadership and sought out ways to solve basin problems by collaborating
with each other and with government agencies rather than merely
lobbying and litigating to change TRPA policies. This is significant when
one considers that many of these organizations were some of the TRPA's
most ardent critics.
The coalescing of interests created an environment for
collaboration. By the late 1980s, Tahoe's reputation as a tourist
destination began to decline. An aging infrastructure and poor growth
planning led to increasingly negative publicity as exemplified by a
California newspaper editorial that noted, "if you don't like gambling
you can drive and look at the ghetto in the mountains." 01 7 Negative press
coverage led to a series of studies in the early 1990s that found some
disturbing trends." One study concluded that "despite certain
competitive advantage... economic performance substantially trails that
of other western U.S. mountain resorts. Critical destination business is
stagnant. Peak period utilization patterns remain a problem."1 9 A series
of surveys discovered that few tourists were repeat visitors and many
complained of the dilapidated infrastructure. Traffic congestion and
106.

See generally MANAGING COMPLEX NETWORKS: STRATEGIES FOR THE PUBLIC SECTOR
J.M. KICKERT et al. eds., 1997) (discussing the concept of policy networks).
107. Kauneckis et al., supra note 5, at 20 (citing an editorial reported second hand by
TRPA planning staff).
108. See, e.g., James E. Fletcher et al., Assessing Public Recreation Service FacilityPreferences
of Tourists and Residents at North Lake Tahoe, California, 11 J. PARK & RECREATION ADMIN. 60
(1993).
(WALTER

109.

DESIGN WORKSHOP, INC. ET AL., NORTH LAKE TAHOE TOURISM DEVELOPMENT

MASTER PLAN 4 (1995).
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parking problems had increased because tourist sites were scattered
around the lake. Casino operators also witnessed a decline due to
increased competition from the relaxation in gaming laws around the
country.
The result was a growing recognition that the tourist industry's
only competitive advantage was the Lake's environmental quality and
recreational opportunities. Business interests were therefore directly tied
to Lake Tahoe's environmental health. " ° As one tourism industry report
noted, while the "TRPA regulatory process presents significant barriers
to redevelopment and disincentives to private investment," it also found
"widespread support for the environmental protection policies
administered by the Tahoe Regional Planning Authority."' By the 1990s,
the TRPA became firmly established as a legitimate planning agency for
the community at large. Moreover, the business community discovered
that not only was it impossible to remove the agency, but their success
was ultimately tied to that of the TRPA.
Businesses are now actively involved in a number of
collaborative projects. One of the more ambitious efforts is the
establishment of the Coordinated Transit System (CTS) involving local
government, state, federal, and business organizations. It focuses on
coordinating public and private (i.e., casino shuttle busses) transportation systems and providing better overall transportation information to
visitors. The intent is to move more people from the major casino, skiing,
and shopping destinations faster and more effectively, thus allowing
increased visits and decreased traffic congestion. The use of alternative
transportation modes (e.g., water taxis, bike trails, etc.) is currently being
explored. 2
Collaborative efforts have also focused on redevelopment. An
example is the Park Avenue Redevelopment Project designed to revive
South Lake Tahoe's flagging economy. The project's key component is
the redevelopment of small, aging, low capacity motels constructed in
the 1960s and 1970s and replacing them with larger-capacity, modern
facilities. The redevelopment plan includes a gondola that will pick up
skiers in a central shopping plaza with shopping boutiques, an iceskating rink, a movie theater, and an arcade and transport them to ski
runs on the California and Nevada sides of the Heavenly Ski Resort. " 3
The environmental component includes scenic improvements, the

110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id.
Kauneckis et al., supra note 5, at 9.
113.
See SOUTH TAHOE REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY, SOUTH TAHOE DEMONSTRATION
REDEVELOPMENT PLAN: FOR SKI RUN AND STATELINE AREAS 4-12 (Draft, City of South Lake
Tahoe 1999).
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creation of a new wetland adjacent to a major hotel to filter runoff, and
trading in development rights, along with other actions designed to
reduce the total impervious surface. Other redevelopment projects have
linked the construction of affordable housing to environmental
restoration.
TRPA and Local Governments
Working relationships between the TRPA and local governments
improved watershed governance. Historically, the basin's regulatory
programs were heavily centralized with the TRPA having authority over
virtually all land use decisions, including those typically reserved for
city and county governments. Local governments viewed the TRPA as
overly intrusive and often opposed the TRPA's efforts to limit
development.11 4 Conversely, the TRPA's supporters argued that its
strong authority was necessary because local governments failed to
recognize regional concerns and demonstrated an inability to effectively
manage development during the 1960s and 1970s.
However, the relationship between the TRPA and local governments has improved considerably in recent years. This can be attributed
in part to the improved planning capacity of local governments, their
increased ability to deal with local issues, and improved communication
with TRPA staff through the establishment of shared norms. Today, all
local governments have professional planners with similar educational
backgrounds and experience as their TRPA counterparts. This increased
professionalism was often noted as an important factor contributing to
the improved relationships between the TRPA and local governments.
As one local planner noted, "planners tend to think alike.""' Another
reported, "The confidence level is increasing on both sides."" 6 Most of
this trust is the result of individuals working together over long periods
of time on specific projects, issues, and other forms of routine interaction
rather than through any formal planning process. A local planner also
suggested that improved local capacity facilitated the shift from "no
development" to "redevelopment" as a focus for environmental
improvements. There is also a shared view that the basin's infrastructure
needs improvement to increase tourism while restoring the
114. "This was reported second-hand by a TRPA official as the reaction of a long-time
opponent to the placement of a representative from the Douglas County planning office
being stationed within TRPA for training purposes." Kauneckis et al., supra note 5, at 18, 75
n.74. For more information on historical conflicts between the TRPA and local
governments, see generally LAURENCE D. BAXTER, REGIONAL POLITICS AND THE CHALLENGE
OF ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING (Inst. of Govtl. Affairs, Envtl. Quality Series No. 22, 1974).
115. Kauneckis et al., supra note 5, at 19.
116. Id. at 50.
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environmental damage caused by poor land use planning and
deteriorating infrastructure. Some local officials even reported that they
not only support the TRPA but that they have begun to strategically shift
the burden for denying controversial local projects to the agency.
This improved relationship led to the TRPA's Permit Integration
Program. The program consists of over 30 Memorandums of
Understanding (MOUs) with local governments, public utility districts,
and other agencies devolving many permitting functions and waving the
requirements of permits for some activities.1 7 The program delegated
authority to some local governments to review and approve certain
development projects, mostly single-family and multi-family residences.
When local governments issue their permits, they certify that the projects
meet TRPA regulations. The TRPA then periodically audits local
permitting activities for quality control. There has also been increased
convergence of local government regulations and those of the TRPA.
While not formally adopting the TRPA's codes and ordinances, the City
of South Lake Tahoe now uses them as informal guidelines. This
convergence emerged out of the close interaction between planners in
the respective agencies during recent redevelopment projects. While
attempts to formally adopt TRPA regulations failed to garner local
support, the close interaction between local officials and the TRPA led to
their de facto utilization as this proved to be a more efficient solution for
both parties. El Dorado County in Nevada, traditionally one of the
TRPA's most ardent opponents, chose a different option. They placed
one of their planners in the TRPA to review El Dorado County permits
for both local and TRPA permit requirements.1 8
The TRPA's efforts to decentralize permitting and craft different
relationships with each local government based on their individual
needs have several benefits. It improves service delivery by providing

117. "The TRPA currently has agreements with the regional Board, the USFS, utility
districts, and most other agencies operating in the Lake Tahoe Watershed." Kauneckis et
al., supra note 5, at 43. The TRPA has also signed MOUs with El Dorado County, City of
South Lake Tahoe, Washoe County, and Placer County. No MOUs have been signed with
Douglas County or Carson City (no vacant parcels). Id. It should be noted that some local
governments have been reluctant to take on some of the regulatory authority offered by the
TRPA since it adds to their financial costs and shifts the burden of denying permits to local
governments. Id. at 18, 75 n.75. As one TRPA official put it, "we are the guys you love to
hate," and the TRPA acts as a convenient scapegoat for many in the basin. Id. Some local
officials are reluctant to now become viewed in a similar way and be blamed for blocking
development. Id.
118. Another example would be the preparation of community plans. "Community
plans are developed with the cooperation of TRPA, the business community, and other
community groups and act to coordinate the accomplishment of remedial projects with
redevelopment and new commercial development in the basin." Kauneckis et al., supra
note 5, at 19, 75 n.77.
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"one stop shopping" for many permit applicants. Decentralizing
decision making for routine local matters provides the TRPA with more
time to focus on issues of truly regional significance. The MOUs
institutionalize existing interpersonal and organizational relationships,
which provide a building block upon which subsequent relationships
can build. The continued interaction between the TRPA and local
government staff also allows trust to develop, which further expands the
possibilities for future collaborative efforts.
Improved Working Relationships with State Agencies
The 1990s also witnessed improved working relationships
between the TRPA and various state agencies. One example is the
improved relationship between the TRPA and the Nevada Department
of Transportation (NDOT). In 1995, the TRPA rejected NDOT's
application for repairing a section of highway by merely repaving it.
Instead, the TRPA wanted NDOT to retrofit the highway to add
measures to control runoff and phosphorous levels. The NDOT's initial
response was that federal and state funding was unavailable for such an
extensive project. In response, the TRPA offered to help NDOT acquire
the funds for the retrofitting. The TRPA worked with NDOT to get a $20
million bond passed along with some additional federal funds to
complete the project. NDOT received national recognition because of its
innovative approach and the success helped secure funding for similar
projects around the state. It also allowed the TRPA to use the project as
an example when discussing road improvements with the California
Department of Transportation.
Respondents also reported improved relations between the
TRPA and the Lahontan Regional Water Quality Control Board (the
Regional Board), California's agency responsible for regulating water
quality issues. The two agencies have complementary missions and
overlapping regulatory authority regarding water quality issues,
contributing to a history of interagency conflict.19' However, the relationship between the two agencies has improved in recent years. Permit
reviews are now governed by an MOU between the two agencies. The
Regional Board relies on the TRPA's review of all residential
development. Permits for commercial development of less than two
acres are reviewed solely by the TRPA, while projects disturbing more
than two acres are reviewed by both agencies. Conversely, the TRPA
119. For example, the regional board had opposed the 1984 Regional Plan and
frequently was at odds with the TRPA over its permit decisions during the 1970s and
1980s. E.g., People of the State of California v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 766 F.2d
1308 (9th Cir. 1985).
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sometimes relies on the regional board for assistance with enforcement
actions since it has greater authority to issue fines.ln
Section 208 of the Clean Water Act further institutionalizes the
relationship between the TRPA and the Regional Board. The EPA
designated the TRPA as the Areawide Waste Treatment Planning
Agency for the Lake Tahoe Basin pursuant to section 208 of the 1972
Clean Water Act."' The Bailey Land Capability System and IPES are
included in their Section 208 Plan."n Consequently, as a high level TRPA
official noted, "if 208 is history.. .we would lose our basic structure.. .we
would have to change the Regional Plan."2 Thus, the Section 208 Plan
serves as a protective backstop, or as one TRPA staff member put it, "the
208 Plan is the gorilla in the closet. " 24It also creates a powerful incentive
for the TRPA and the Regional Board to work together within the current
system because changing the Regional Plan also requires amending the
Section 208 plan. Both involve a lengthy process with numerous avenues
for legal challenge. Thus, while rarely used elsewhere, the Section 208
Plan is an integral part of basin management.
LESSONS FOR PRACTITIONERS
While there are some characteristics that make Lake Tahoe's
governance system unique, the case reveals important lessons about
watershed governance and the role that collaboration often plays. While
the reasons for the transition from conflict to collaboration are complex
and beyond the control of individual decision makers, the Lake Tahoe
experience offers a number of lessons for professionals working in
watershed management.

120.
TRPA
121.
122.

The regional board has the authority to impose fines administratively whereas the
can only impose fines using the judicial system. Kauneckis et al., supra note 5, at 17.
33 U.S.C. § 1288 (2000).
According to Kauneckis et al.,
The California State Water Quality Control Board (SWQCB) rejected the
original Section 208 plan because of its voluntary nature, but it finally
accepted a more proactive plan in 1980 that was the result of a
compromise between the TRPA and Regional Board. The resulting Water
Quality Management Plan for the Lake Tahoe Region applies only to the
California side of the basin. Impacts from parcels on the Nevada side are
reviewed on a case-by-case basis.
Kauneckis et al., supra note 5, at 59.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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Collaboration versus Consensus
Collaboration does not mean consensus. The distinction between
collaboration and consensus is similar to that between "allies" and
"friends." An ally is there only for particular problems or a specific issue,
usually when there are mutual benefits to cooperation. Friendship
implies a denser set of personal or organizational relationships (often
based on trust) and general agreement on a broader range of interests or
issues. Accordingly, collaboration is often strategic and limited to winwin or at least win-no-lose situations. In Lake Tahoe, conflict and
litigation continue over a number of issues in the basin. However, the
parties have found productive ways to work together on a variety of
issues. Nevertheless, reaching agreement on one issue does not
necessarily mean agreement on other issues. For example, actors
continue to oppose one another on issues such as takings on private
lands while they have been able to reach agreement and find ways to
work together on transportation and water quality issues.
Inertia and the Bandwagon Effect
Collaboration tends to be a trial and error process in which the
outcomes of one effort such as trust become precursors for subsequent
cooperative efforts. Thus, collaboration is a dynamic and constantly
changing process. Research often finds that when actors engage in
collaborative efforts, there is a certain amount of "collaborative inertia"
that has to be overcome.'9 Because collaboration requires significant
investments of time and effort to build relationships and trust, repeated
interaction is an important precursor to joint action. It also takes time to
develop shared understanding of problems, find opportunities for joint
action with the potential for mutual gain, and obtain the resources
necessary to support these actions. The initial progress is often slow.
However, once a threshold level of success is achieved, the situation can
change rapidly and the collaborative process takes on a new dynamic."6
The establishment of working relationships reduces the time necessary to
plan and implement projects. Researchers refer to this phenomenon as
the "bandwagon effect"; collaborative efforts often build momentum,
and resources, and efforts expand
pick up speed, and gain new members
1 27
issues.
of
set
wider
a
address
to

125.
126.

BARDACH, supra note 11, at 270.
Id.
E.g., BARDACH, supra note 11, at 276; JULIA M. WONDOLLECK & STEVEN L. YAFFEE,

127.
MAKING COLLABORATION WORK: LESSONS FROM INNOVATION IN NATURAL RESOURCE
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Lake Tahoe is an excellent example of collaborative inertia and
bandwagon effects. After more than two decades of conflict,
governmental and nongovernmental actors became increasingly
dissatisfied with the costs and problems associated with inaction. This
impasse created an incentive for collaboration, and a subset of actors
began to work together on what eventually came to be known as the
Tahoe Transportation and Water Quality Coalition. As these
organizations experienced some success, they sought out additional
opportunities for joint action. For example, local governments became
increasingly willing to work with the TRPA to streamline the permit
process. Today, the EIP has a momentum of its own attracting new
partners and resources. Moreover, as the partners learned how to work
together to implement the EIP, the pace of activity increased.
Organizations overcame their differences and achieved the threshold
level of success necessary to develop and implement the EIP through
collaborative know how and increased trust.
Developing "Collaborative Know How"
Some organizations are accustomed to collaborative processes,
but others need to learn how to cooperate and work with organizations
that have different values, procedures, and processes. When
organizations participate in collaborative processes, they often engage in
a particular form of organizational learning that produces "collaborative
know how." 2 '
Interorganizational collaboration develops as part of a learning
process. It has a threshold effect. Once the relationship between
organizations is established, and collaborative projects are successful, it
is much easier to take on additional collaboration. Organizations and the
individuals that comprise them learn how to collaborate by
collaborating. As a corollary, organizations learn how to govern
collaborative processes and find ways to reduce the costs of interacting
with other organizations.'2 It takes time to find ways to take advantage
of the complementary or synergistic relationships between organizations. Learning how to effectively plan and implement collaborative
projects or, conversely, to identify and avoid ineffective activities, also
MANAGEMENT (2000); Matthew S. Kraatz, Learning by Association? Interorganizational
Networks and Adaptation to Environmental Change, 41 ACAD. OF MGMT. J.621 (1998).

128. See Bernard L. Simonin, The Importance of CollaborativeKnow-How: An Empirical Test
of the LearningOrganization, 40 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 1150 (1997).
129.

See generally Jeffrey H. Dyer & Harbir Singh, The Relational View: Cooperative

Strategy and Sources of InterorganizationalCompetitive Advantage, 23 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV.
660 (1998); Simonin, supra note 128; Kraatz, supra note 127 (discussing the collaborative
process).
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For example, when the initial EIP was developed,
takes time.
participants underestimated the amount of time required to plan,
develop, and implement some projects and had to readjust their time
schedules. However, the scope and pace of activity increased when
participants gained experience implementing collaborative projects. This
suggests that practitioners should gradually scale up collaborative efforts
over time in order to build on early successes and allow sufficient time
for these learning processes to occur.
Importance of Trust and Relationships
Equally important is the level of trust and the types of
relationships that develop as a result of interactions. Respondents
frequently pointed to trust and the development of personal and interorganizational relationships as being an important precursor to and
product of the collaborative processes in Lake Tahoe. In some cases,
informal lunch meetings created trust. In others, trust emerged out of
repeated interactions at formal meetings such as TRPA hearings.
Whether the result of formal or informal interactions, this "social capital"
is important.1 3 ' It facilitates cooperative efforts because people have a
preference for transacting with familiar individuals and organizations.
Shared norms and trust lower transaction costs by promoting smooth
and efficient resource exchanges because participants are more likely to
make commitments when they do not fear being taken advantage of by a
trusted organization.132 Relationships based on trust likewise facilitate the

130. See generally Ranjay Gulati, Social Structure and Alliance Formation Patterns: A
Longitudinal Study, 40 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 619 (1995); Jeffrey H. Dyer & Harbir Singh, supra note
129; Simonin, supra note 128; Kraatz, supra note 127 (examining the effectiveness of
collaborative projects).
131. Viewed broadly, social capital encompasses social ties, trusting relations, and value
systems that facilitate the individual and organizational actions within that context. It is
something that is jointly owned rather than controlled by one party to a relationship. Thus,
social capital is both the resources contacts hold and the structure of a network. See
generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM, Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital, 6 J.
DEMOCRACY 65 (1995); JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY (1990); Carrie
R. Leana & Harry J. Van Buren III, OrganizationalSocial Capital and Employment Practices,24
ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 538 (1999); RONALD S. BURT, STRUCTURAL HOLES: THE SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF COMPETITION (1992); Jane Fountain, Social Capital:Its Relationship to Innovation

in Science and Technology, 25 SC. & PUB. POL'Y 103 (1998).
132. See Wenpin Tsai & Sumantra Ghoshal, Social Capital and Value Creation: The Role of
Intrafirm Networks, 41 ACAD. OF MGMT. J. 464, 467-68 (1998); Andrew C. Wicks et al., The
Structure of Optimal Trust: Moral and Strategic Implications, 24 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 99, 99100 (1999).
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flow of information, since information from a trusted source is presumed
to be both more reliable and accurate.1 33
The importance of trust has several implications for practitioners
seeking to understand the process of watershed governance. During
early collaborative efforts there is often less trust and weaker personal
and organizational relationships. As trust and relationships build,
collaboration becomes easier, making trust both an antecedent to and an
outcome of collaborative processes.' Thus, a "virtuous circle" of
escalating trust and further collaboration develops if initial collaborative
efforts are effective, which helps explain the emergence of the bandwagon effect." While there is no magic recipe for developing trust and
relationships, repeated interactions are an important ingredient.'3 These
interactions come in various forms ranging from participation in a
restoration project to ongoing interactive processes (e.g., an advisory
committee, permit review process, etc.).137 They can even be the product
of a series of conflicts as was the case in Lake Tahoe.
Practitioners should also remember that, once trust and
relationships have developed, they need to make an effort to maintain
this social capital. They should also create mechanisms to socialize new
participants to the norms, values, and routines associated with
collaborative processes.m Otherwise, trust and relationships will quickly
erode, especially if there is a high turnover in staff or agency leadership.
Conversely, while trust tends to build slowly over time, it can be
destroyed quickly as a result of negative experiences. Thus, when
practitioners use collaboration to improve watershed governance, they
should avoid situations that have a high risk of failure or a likelihood of
generating conflict. This will allow practitioners to build on early
successes that generate social capital.
Developing Networked Systems
Lake Tahoe is also an excellent illustration of the changing
nature of federalism, local capacity-building, and incentives for solving
environmental problems. While early efforts focused on centralizing
133. See Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problems of
Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. Soc. 481,490 (1985).
134. Leana & Van Buren, supranote 131, at 542; Tsai & Ghoshal, supra note 132, at 465.
135. David P. McCaffrey et al., The Appeal and Difficulties of ParticipativeSystems, 6 ORG.
Sci. 603 (1995).
136.

See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).

137. Larry L. Kiser & Elinor Ostrom, The Three Worlds of Action: A Metatheoretical
Synthesis of Institutional Approaches, in STRATEGIES FOR POLTICAL INQUIRY 179, 203 (Elinor
Ostrom ed., 1982).
138. See generally Leana & Van Buren, supra note 131.
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decision making in the TRPA, recently many permit decisions were
decentralized to local governments when their capacity for addressing
watershed problems increased. Lake Tahoe also demonstrates that
watershed governance, by its transboundary nature, is likely to involve
complex institutional arrangements where some decisions are
centralized and others highly decentralized. Given the U.S. federal
system, there will always be overlapping centers of authority. Even
though the TRPA has considerable authority, local governments, the
Lake Tahoe Basin Management Unit, and other federal and state
agencies retain important roles in basin governance. Moreover, Lake
Tahoe illustrates the strong role that nongovernmental organizations
have in a governance system that increasingly relies on nonregulatory
policy instruments.
Lake Tahoe demonstrates that a "networked" approach to
watershed governance can be effective. Accordingly, while it is
important for practitioners to understand how ecological systems
function, it is equally important to understand the "ecology of
governance," that is, the broader context within which governance
occurs."' The ecology of governance includes the watershed's unique
contextual setting, relative tradeoffs among problems, the organizations
that address the problems, and how these actors and programs function
and interact. Practitioners must recognize that there is an institutional
system that corresponds to the ecological system. Practitioners need to
understand this institutional system because it creates opportunities for
joint action while simultaneously imposing constraints on working
together. It also determines how government and the industries and
activities that cause problems are organized. This knowledge is critical
for designing successful policy interventions and implementation
structures. Practitioners also need to account for the linkages and
tradeoffs among problems when looking for opportunities to collaborate
as it will help identify potential partners for collaborative action as well
"
as organizations that may be sources of political opposition.
Think Holistically but Act Strategically
Practitioners should be encouraged to find that even when there
is a history of interorganizational conflict, organizations can often find

139. What is recommended is an analysis similar to the type of forward and backward
mapping recommended in the implementation literature. See generally Richard F. Elmore,
Forward and Backward Mapping: Reversible Logic in the Analyses of Public Policy, in POLICY
IMPLEMENTATION IN FEDERAL AND UNITARY SYSTEMS: QUESTIONS OF ANALYSIS AND DESIGN

33 (Kenneth Hanf & Theo A. J. Toonen eds., 1985).
140. WONDOLLECK & YAFFEE, supranote 127, at 82.
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productive ways to work together when collaborative efforts highlight
common interests and build on the trust and relationships that develop
through previous interactions. However, collaboration can be limited
both in terms of its overall effect as well as its potential. Organizations
often have institutional constraints that prevent them from participating
in collaborative efforts. The configuration of their collective constraints
may limit the number of plausible activities that can be implemented.
Even when an organization's formal rules do not conflict, its behavioral
norms, professional values, knowledge, experience, and abilities may
cause it to resist cooperating. 4 For example, collaboration results in
some loss of autonomy, which for some organizations will be
undesirable. Moreover, even when organizations want to collaborate,
institutional constraints may prevent joint action. For example, statutes
may give organizations conflicting missions or budgetary constraints
may limit an organization's ability to contribute resources.
Understanding these institutional constraints is important. Some are
fixed by external organizations (e.g., limits on how grant funds can be
used), while others are more malleable and are based on an organization's perceptions of what collaboration will cost or its corresponding
value.
Fortunately, the constraints and obstacles to collaboration are
often less formidable than they appear. Lake Tahoe demonstrates that,
when collaborative efforts highlight common values and interests,
participants often find creative ways to bridge seemingly incompatible
differences and institutional constraints.' Organizations may also be
willing to sacrifice some autonomy when they expect something of value
in return. 3 Thus, collaboration is both an individually rational strategy
as well as a means of collectively improving watershed governance."'
This implies that collaboration will typically be limited to issues of
mutual interest that are primarily win-win or at least win-no-lose
situations (i.e., non-zero-sum games).'45 Accordingly, while watershed
management encourages practitioners to view ecosystems holistically,
collaboration is inherently strategic and is unlikely to be an appropriate
strategy for addressing controversial problems involving win-lose
situations (i.e., zero-sum games). The case also demonstrates that, while
participants may work together on some issues, they have to be willing

141. Id. at 60.
142. Id. at 73.
143. See generally Christine Oliver, Network Relations and Loss of OrganizationalAutonomy,
44 HuM. REL. 943 (1991).
144. See generally McCaffrey et al., supranote 135.
145. WONDOLLECK & YAFFEE, supra note 127, at 48.
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to agree to disagree on others and respect these differences if they are to
maintain cooperative working relationships.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
All watersheds are managed by a myriad of governmental and
nongovernmental organizations whose decisions and actions influence
the health of the watershed and its ecosystems. The corresponding
institutional fragmentation creates conflict, but it also creates
opportunities for these organizations to work together in ways that
improve environmental conditions and enhance watershed governance.
Thus, watershed management is as much a challenge of governance as it
is a question of science and designing effective policies.
The experiences in Lake Tahoe clearly indicate the important
role that collaboration plays in improving watershed governance. It
allowed organizations to implement projects (e.g., redevelopment,
habitat restoration, etc.) that otherwise would have been impossible. It
improved the efficiency of the TRPA's permit process and enforcement
efforts. It also produced the EIP, a unified approach to improving
environmental conditions in the watershed. Accordingly, the shift from
conflict-oriented to cooperative approaches to basin governance over the
last decade has resulted in tangible environmental improvements.
While collaboration is a useful strategy for enhancing watershed
governance, it is important for practitioners to recognize that there are
clear limits to its use. Unilateral action, litigation, legislative intervention,
markets, and hierarchical control remain alternative strategies that
continue to be used by various governmental and nongovernmental
organizations in Lake Tahoe. What has changed is that practitioners tend
to look for cooperative solutions first rather than immediately resorting
to conflict-oriented governance strategies. Practitioners also tend to be
more pragmatic and recognize that some conflict is unavoidable and at
times is even beneficial because it promotes healthy discourse and
stimulates policy change and learning.1" After all, the collaborative
efforts underway in Lake Tahoe are themselves a product of the conflict
experienced during the previous two decades. Consequently,
practitioners are more willing to respect each other's differences today
than they were in the past. This fosters an atmosphere that encourages

146. See Mark T. Imperial, Analyzing Institutional Arrangements for Ecosystem-Based
Management: The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework, 24 ENVTL. MGMT. 461
(1999); WILLIAM A. BLOMQUIST, DIVIDING THE WATERS: GOVERNING GROUNDWATER IN
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 360 (1992); VINCENT OSTROM, THE MEANING OF AMERICAN
FEDERALISM: CONSTITUTING A SELF-GOVERNING SOCIETY 258 (1991).
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practitioners to work together and try to find creative ways to solve their
shared problems.
Collaboration should also be valued only when it produces
better organizational performance or lowers costs. As Bardach advises,
We should not be impressed by the idea of collaboration
per se. That collaboration is nicer sounding than indifference, conflict, or competition is beside the point. So, too,
is the fact that collaboration often makes people feel better
than conflict or competition. I do not want to oversell the
benefits of interagency collaboration. The political struggle
to develop collaborative capacity can be time consuming
and divisive. But even if no such struggle were to17 ensue,
the benefits of collaboration are necessarily limited.
As Lake Tahoe clearly demonstrates, there will be limits on
practitioners' ability to use collaboration as a strategy for improving
watershed governance. Our federal system of government creates an
underlying tension as to whether federal, state, or local priorities and
decisions should govern a watershed. It is also unclear when
organizations can or should be willing to sacrifice their priorities or those
of the constituencies they represent in order to participate in
collaborative efforts. No amount of creativity can overcome a shortage of
the resources (e.g., staff, money, etc.) necessary to participate in these
activities.'4 Conversely, Lake Tahoe demonstrates that when collaboration highlights common values and interests, participants often find
productive ways to work together and generate greater public value than
can be achieved by working alone. Thus, it remains an important
strategy for improving watershed governance.

147.

BARDACH, supra note 11,

148.

Id.

at 17.

